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William Rininger***

ABSTRACT
The United States is in the midst of an unprecedented mass incarceration
crisis. It imprisons more of its citizens than any other country – and by a considerable margin. It is now widely acknowledged that there is no community
dividend stemming from an overly punitive sentencing system. Over-incarceration does not make the community safer and diverts billions of dollars annually from productive social services, such as health and education. Lawmakers
have failed to find overarching solutions to this crisis. This Article proposes
to change that paradigm by offering concrete reforms to remedy a key shortcoming of the sentencing system. Emerging evidence suggests that one of the
main reasons for the mass incarceration crisis relates to the dysfunctional plea
bargaining process, in which the prosecution has the stronger negotiating
power and often uses it to press for harsh penalties. The reality is that most
defendants in the United States do not receive a trial, let alone a fair one. Their
fate is determined by a negotiation with a prosecutor. More than ninety percent of all criminal matters in the United States are finalized in this manner.
There is a wide-ranging consensus that this process is flawed. It results in a
large portion of defendants receiving harsher penalties than is commensurate
with the seriousness of their offense. Sometimes it also leads to defendants,
who are innocent, pleading guilty in order to avoid the uncertainty of a trial.
The process is especially unfair to minority groups, with evidence establishing
that African Americans, in particular, receive harsher penalties than similarly
situated white defendants. This Article proposes reforms to the plea bargaining process that will demonstrably and profoundly reshape the framework for
plea negotiations. The central plank of the proposed reform is to shift more
discretion and power from prosecutors, who invariably agitate for tougher sentences, into the hands of (impartial) sentencing judges. This can be achieved
by conferring a discount to offenders who plead guilty. The size of the discount
should be up to thirty percent. A similar system already operates effectively in
Australia. In addition to this, defendants who plead guilty in circumstances
when there is a weak prosecution case (and who are tenably innocent) should
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receive a discount of up to seventy-five percent. This proposal would considerably reduce incarceration numbers in a way that does not compromise community safety and preserves the cost-saving benefits of the current plea bargaining process. The reform will also reduce the discriminatory operation of
the sentencing system against offenders who come from socially and economically deprived backgrounds.

INTRODUCTION
The sentencing system in the United States is in crisis. America imprisons more of its people than any other country in the world by a massive margin
– on average five times more than other developed countries. 1 Mass incarceration is arguably the greatest human rights crisis currently in the United States. 2
There are a number of reasons for this, including overly harsh penalties and
mandatory sentences for a large number of offenses. Recent evidence suggests
that another major cause of the crisis is the process by which most defendants
are sentenced and, in particular, the role of the prosecution in this process. 3
Most defendants in the United States are not found guilty following a
trial. 4 Instead more than ninety-seven percent of federal defendants and ninetyfour percent of state defendants are sentenced pursuant to a plea bargain with
the prosecutor. 5 As noted by Justice Anthony Kennedy, “the reality [is] that
criminal justice today is, for the most part, a system of pleas, not a system of
trials.” 6 He adds, “horse trading [between the defendant and the prosecution]
determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is.
It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice
* Director of the Evidence-Based Sentencing and Criminal Justice Project, Swinburne
University, Melbourne.
** Associate Professor, University of Melbourne Law School.
*** J.D., the University of Akron School of Law, 2017.
1. See infra Part I.
2. See generally Mirko Bagaric, Sandeep Gopalan & Marissa Florio, A Principled Strategy for Addressing the Incarceration Crisis: Redefining Excessive Imprisonment as a Human Rights Abuse, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663 (2017).
3. See, e.g., Cynthia Alkon, An Overlooked Key to Reversing Mass Incarceration: Reforming the Law to Reduce Prosecutorial Power in Plea Bargaining, 15 U. MD.
L. J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 191, 198–99 (2015).
4. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012).
5. For an overview of the plea-bargaining process in the United States and a comparison with other countries, see Carol A. Brook et al., A Comparative Look at Plea
Bargaining in Australia, Canada, England, New Zealand, and the United States, 57
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1147 (2016) and its frequency of use; see also Frye, 566 U.S. at
142–44; Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining:
The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 565 (2014); Laurie L.
Levenson, Peeking Behind the Plea Bargaining Process: Missouri v. Frye & Lafler v.
Cooper, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 457, 459–63 (2013).
6. Aditi Juneja, Note, A Holistic Framework to Aid Responsible Plea-Bargaining
by Prosecutors, 11 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 600 (2017).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss1/5

2

Bagaric et al.: Plea Bargaining

2019]

PLEA BARGAINING

3

system.” 7 Plea bargaining is so prevalent and one-sided that it has been asserted that “[the] constitutional right [to trial by jury], for most, is a myth.” 8
In nearly all instances, the plea bargain reached by the prosecutor and the
defendant is implemented by the court. 9 Prosecution officials are often motivated to push for heavy penalties. 10 In addition to this, they have considerably
more negotiating power than defendants, given that they are normally better
resourced and their personal interests are not at stake. This imbalance is so
profound that it even leads to many innocent defendants pleading guilty and
many others accepting harsher penalties than is commensurate with the seriousness of their crimes. 11 Further, studies have shown that minority groups,
including African Americans, are dealt with especially harshly by the plea bargaining process. 12
There is a growing recognition that the pervasive and overly punitive
manner of prosecutorial power in plea bargaining is a key cause of mass incarceration. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Economist Professor Peter
Temin notes that one of the major causes of increasing prison numbers over
the past few decades is the manner in which the plea bargaining process is
constructed and in particular the
increasing power of public prosecutors. The number of line prosecutors, that is, those that try cases, rose from 17,000 in 1970 to 20,000 in
1990 and to 30,000 in 2007. The number of public defenders did not
rise, and the result was increasing power of public prosecutors. They
used their power to seek plea bargains, and jurisprudence moved from
the courtroom to the offices of public prosecutors. Prosecutors used
their new power to increase the sensitivity of incarceration to the crime
rate . . . . 13

7. Frye, 566 U.S. at 144 (alteration in original) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L. J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
8. Dylan Walsh, Why U.S. Criminal Courts Are So Dependent on Plea Bargain(May 2,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/aring,
ATLANTIC
chive/2017/05/plea-bargaining-courts-prosecutors/524112/; see also John L. Kane,
Plea Bargaining and the Innocent, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 26, 2014),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/26/plea-bargaining-and-the-innocent;
Suja A. Thomas, Has Plea Bargaining Destroyed the Jury Trial?, CRIME REP. (Nov.
28, 2017), https://thecrimereport.org/2017/11/28/what-happened-to-the-americanjury-trial/.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See Emily Yoffee, Innocence Is Irrelevant, ATLANTIC (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171/.
13. Peter Temin, The Political Economy of Mass Incarceration: An Analytical
Model 11–12 (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking Working Paper Series No. 56, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2993969.
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In a similar vein, Professor Lissa Griffin, an expert in criminal law at Pace
University School of Law, and Ellen Yaroshefsky, a professor of legal ethics
at Hofstra University School of Law, observe that the dynamics of plea bargaining is an under-researched area of the law and that there is growing evidence that aggressive prosecution practices are a major cause of mass incarceration:
Surprisingly, in looking for the causes and cures for the mass incarceration state, very little, if any, attention has been paid to the role of the
most powerful actor in the criminal justice system: the prosecutor. It is
the prosecutor who exercises virtually unreviewable discretion in seeking charges, determining bail, negotiating a resolution, and fixing the
sentence. Now, however, there is data that identifies aggressive prosecutorial charging practices as the major cause of the explosion in our
prison population. 14

It is now widely acknowledged that the plea bargaining process is seriously flawed. 15 At the same time, it has been noted that it is an entrenched part
of the criminal justice system and that its abolition is untenable. 16 As noted by
Emily Yoffee, an editor at The Atlantic, American legislators have criminalized
so many forms of behavior that police are arresting and charging millions of
people annually – eleven million in 2015. 17 Court resources have now increased commensurate with this. And “[t]aking to trial even a significant proportion of those who are charged would grind proceedings to a halt . . . . [T]he
criminal-justice system has become a ‘capacious, onerous machinery that
sweeps everyone in,’ and plea bargains, with their swift finality, are what keep
that machinery running smoothly.” 18
Thus, there is a pressing need to reform the plea bargaining system. 19
This Article proposes a fundamental reform of this process that will lead to
fairer and more balanced outcomes. This requires some of the influence and

14. Lissa Griffin & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ministers of Justice and Mass Incarceration, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 301, 301 (2017).
15. See infra Part III; see generally Brook et al., supra note 5.
16. See infra Part II.
17. Yoffee, supra note 12.
18. Id.
19.
There is no obvious recipe for fomenting this kind of reform . . . . But she did
concede one common thread that unites jurisdictions invested in changing the
plea process: They must be motivated by some overarching values besides efficiency, ‘like seeking justice,’ [a law professor] said, “however that’s defined.”

Walsh, supra note 8. For a suggestion that prosecutors should be less punitive, see
Juneja, supra note 6; see also Colin Miller, Plea Agreements as Constitutional Contracts (July 5, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2997499.
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power in the process to be removed from prosecutors and allocated to the sentencing judges – who have a more dispassionate and objective role in the sentencing system. We suggest that the sentencing system would be considerably
enhanced if there is a legislated discount for defendants who plead guilty. The
exact size of the discount would be determined by the sentencing judge, but the
parameters of the discount would be between ten to thirty percent of the maximum penalty for the offense. This is similar to the system that currently operates successfully in Australia. In addition to this, a large discount of up to
seventy-five percent should apply in circumstances when defendants plead
guilty where the prosecution’s case is very weak. This larger discount reflects
the fact that this cohort of defendants not only saved the community time and
money by not exercising their right to trial but also relinquished a tenable
chance of acquittal.
Certainly, the reform is not a perfect solution to the imbalance inherent in
the plea bargaining process. Prosecutors would continue to have a large degree
of influence regarding the ultimate choice of charges. However, their authority
regarding the exact penalty would be considerably diminished.
The innovation of our proposal is that it will give considerably more control over the sentencing outcomes to judges without meaningfully over-burdening them, thereby preserving the cost saving benefits stemming from plea bargaining. Moreover, it will lead to the imposition of less severe sanctions and
reduce prison numbers without compromising community safety.
In Part I of the Article, we discuss the scope and extent of the current
crisis in the United States sentencing system. This is followed in Part II by a
discussion of the causes of the crisis, with a focus on the role of prosecution
officials. In Part III, we outline our reform proposal. Possible objections to
our reform are examined in Part IV. In the concluding remarks, we summarize
the reform proposal and the manifest benefits that it would bring to the criminal
justice system.

I. THE CURRENT CRISIS THAT IS UNITED STATES SENTENCING LAW
AND PRACTICE
Prior to discussing the need for reform in the sentencing process, we first
provide an overview of the current shortcomings with the United States sentencing system and highlight the need for urgent, systematic reform.

A. The Alarming Rate of Incarceration in the United States
The United States incarcerates more people, by a considerable margin,
than any other nation. 20 Its incarceration rate is around five times the average
20. It has been estimated there were more than 2.2 million prisoners in the United
States in 2016. ROY WALMSLEY, INST. CRIM. POL’Y RES. WORLD PRISON POPULATION
LIST: ELEVENTH EDITION 2 (2016), http://prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/world_prison_population_list_11th_edition_0.pdf. China had the
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of other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”)
countries 21 and up to ten times higher than some Scandinavian countries. 22 The
rate of incarceration has grown considerably since the 1970s. 23 It has more
than doubled in the fifteen years leading up to 2011. 24 Although there have
been some marginal decreases in prison numbers since 2011, 25 estimates show
that at the current rate of decline it would take in excess of three decades to
return the prison population to the size it was before the climb toward mass
incarceration. 26 The magnitude of this mass incarceration crisis was highlighted in a recent report in the New York Bar Association:
next highest incarceration level with estimated incarceration rates exceeding 1.65 million. Id. After the United States and China, the Russian Federation incarcerates approximately 640,000. Id. On a per capita basis, the United States has the highest incarceration rate with the exception of Seychelles. Id. Its incarceration rate of 698 per
100,000 of national population is almost five times the world average of 144 and more
than eight times the median rate for western European countries. Id.
21. MELISSA S. KEARNEY ET AL., THE HAMILTON PROJECT: TEN ECONOMIC FACTS
ABOUT CRIME AND INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2014), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads_and_links/v8_THP_10CrimeFacts.pdf.
Rates in the OECD range from 47 to 266 per 100,000 adult population. Id. at 10.
22. By comparison, for example, the rates of incarceration per 100,000 adults in
other countries are New Zealand (192); United Kingdom (147); Canada (118); Germany (78); and Sweden (67). Id.
23. See JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1
(2014) [hereinafter THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES]. In fact,
during this period it has quadrupled. Id.
24. Albert Hunt, A Country of Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/us/21iht-letter21.html.
25. There was a reduction of about three percent in 2011 and 2012 and slight reductions in 2014 and 2015. See Matthew Friedman, The U.S. Prison Population Is
Down (A Little), BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/us-prison-population-down-little. In 2014, there was a slight decrease
in federal and state prison numbers, but this was partially offset by an increase in local
jail numbers. Id. State and federal prison numbers decreased by 15,400 people from
December 31, 2013, to December 31, 2014. Id. However, county and city jail numbers
increased by 13,384 inmates from mid-year 2013 to mid-year 2014. Id. While these
time periods are not aligned, they are indicative of a larger trend. The increasing jail
numbers are eclipsing the progress made by decreasing prison numbers. In 2015, the
number of prisoners dropped by 51,300 to 2,173,800 (i.e., a drop of about 2.5%).
LAUREN GLAZE & DANIELLE KAEBLE, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015, at 1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus15.pdf. By contrast, there was an increase of 4,300 prisoners in 2013
when compared with 2012. While the federal prison population decreased for the first
time since 1980, it was more than offset by an increase in the state prison population
(the first increase since 2009). See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS,
PRISONERS IN 2013, at 1 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf.
26. Daniel Denvir, America’s Durable Monstrosity, JACOBIN (Jan. 9, 2017),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/01/mass-incarceration-prison-bureau-justice-statistics/.
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The American criminal justice system currently holds more than 2.2
million people in an estimated 1,719 state prisons . . . . No matter how
many times the statistics are repeated, they remain shocking: The
United States has 4% of the world’s population and 21% of the world’s
prisoners, nearly 40% of whom are African-American. 27

The most obvious, though not exclusive, reason for the mass incarceration
crisis has been the increase in the severity of penalties over the past half century. Although different sentencing systems exist between the states and the
federal system, 28 they share many common objectives, including community
protection, general and specific deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. 29
The objective of community protection has assumed paramount importance
over the past few decades, 30 which is reflected in part by the increase in harsh
prescriptive penalty laws – including fixed, minimum, or presumptive penalties 31 – that apply to varying degrees in all U.S. jurisdictions. 32
Sentencing grids are typically used to set out prescribed penalties, which
are calculated principally by reference to an offender’s criminal history 33 and
the seriousness of the offense. 34 There is an abundance of evidence to suggest
that the increased adoption of guidelines and mandatory minimums has increased both the rate and duration of incarceration in the face of an overall

27. TASKFORCE ON MASS INCARCERATION, N.Y. CITY BAR ASS’N, MASS
INCARCERATION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 1–2 (2017),
http://documents.nycbar.org/files/mass_incarceration_where_do_we_go_from_here.pdf. This followed an earlier report by the New
York City Bar Association. See generally MARIA CILENTI, N.Y. CITY BAR ASS’N,
MASS INCARCERATION: SEIZING THE MOMENT FOR REFORM (2015),
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/Mass_Incarceration_Seizing_the_Moment_for_Reform-20150928.pdf.
28. Sentencing – and more generally, criminal law – in the United States is mainly
the province of the states. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000)
(citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)).
29. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION
GUIDELINES MANUAL 2 (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2016/GLMFull.pdf [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016].
30. See THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 23,
at 9 (discussing the social benefits and effects of incarceration).
31. For the purposes of clarity, these both come under the terminology of fixed or
standard penalties in this Article.
32. THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 23, at 72–
73, 76–78.
33. This is based mainly on the number, seriousness, and age of the prior convictions. Alexis Lee Watts, In Depth: Sentencing Guideline Grids, ROBINA INST. OF CRIM.
L. & CRIM. JUST. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://sentencing.umn.edu/content/depth-sentencingguideline-grids.
34. Id.
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decrease in crime rate. 35 Studies have demonstrated, for example, that the average duration of prison terms has increased more than thirty percent since the
late 1990s 36 and that there has been a four hundred percent rise in prisoners
serving life sentences since the 1980s. 37 This is the case despite a declining
crime rate during that time. 38

35. See, e.g., MICHAEL MITCHELL & MICHAEL LEACHMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES, CHANGING PRIORITIES: STATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS AND
INVESTMENTS IN EDUCATION 13 (2014), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/10-28-14sfp.pdf; see also More Prisoners, Less Probation for Federal Offenders, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/01/pspp_fs_moreprisonlessprobation_v1.pdf. For example, Michael Tonry
references the “litany of tough-on crime sentencing laws” enacted in the 1980s and
1990s, which required “sentences of historically unprecedented lengths of broad categories of offenses and offenders” as the “primary causes of contemporary levels of
imprisonment.” Michael Tonry, Remodeling American Sentencing: A Ten-Step Blueprint for Moving Past Mass Incarceration, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 503, 514
(2014); see also Michael Tonry, The Questionable Relevance of Previous Convictions
to Punishments for Later Crimes, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING 91 (Andrew von Hirsch & Julian V. Roberts eds., 2010). For further criticism of the Guidelines, see Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the
Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 92–93 (2005); Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 40 (2006); James
S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173 (2010). John Pfaff’s
“Locked In” and James Forman’s “Locking Up Our Own” argue that the key reason for
the increase in incarceration numbers is stricter prosecution practices, reflected by a
higher rate of felonies being charged. See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE
CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017); JAMES
FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA
(2017); see also Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little
Law, Too Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691 (2010).
36. See, e.g., PEW CHARITABLE TR., TIME SERVED, THE HIGH COST, LOW RETURN
OF LONGER PRISON TERMS 3 (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/sentencing_and_corrections/prisontimeservedpdf.pdf. From 1990 to 2009, there has been an 37% increase of time served for
violent crimes, 24% for property crimes, and 36% for drug crimes. Id.
37. Ashley Nellis, SENT’G PROJECT, STILL LIFE: AMERICA’S INCREASING USE OF
LIFE AND LONG-TERM SENTENCES 7 (2017), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Still-Life.pdf.
38. Id. at 6. The Sentencing Project also reported a significant increase in inmates
serving life sentences without the possibility of parole since 2008, and a more recent
study showed that the number of offenders serving life terms is now at a record high.
Id. at 7. There are currently 161,957 prisoners serving a life term and a further 44,311
offenders serving a virtual life sentence (that is, a term of fifty years or more). Id. This
amounts to 13.9% of the entire prison population. Id. at 10. Nearly half of these prisoners (48.3%) are African American. Id. at 5. Incredibly, the United States’ incarceration rate for life terms is approximately fifty per 100,000 of the population, which is
about the same as the entire incarceration rate of Finland, Sweden, and Denmark. Id.
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Fundamental reform of the sentencing system is required in order to reduce the levels of incarceration in the United States. Reform must be driven
by empirical data regarding the efficacy of sanctions to achieve sentencing
goals and normative considerations regarding the appropriateness of certain
forms of punishment. 39 These considerations suggest that, in broad terms, the
sentencing system would be vastly improved if prison was reserved for offenders who commit serious sexual and violent offenses. 40
The key rationale for this conclusion stems from a number of findings.
Empirical evidence establishes that key sentencing objectives used to justify
longer prison terms are unattainable. 41 It has been repeatedly demonstrated
that harsher penalties have no meaningful impact in terms of discouraging potential offenders. 42 The goal of general deterrence cannot, therefore, be used
to justify harsher penalties. Further, harsh terms do not dissuade individual
offenders from reoffending. Specific deterrence should, as a result, be abolished as a sentencing consideration. 43 Imprisonment should not be pursued for
minor offenses because the cost of imprisonment and the suffering inflicted on
those offenders outweighs the harm caused by the crime. 44 Ultimately, prison
terms can only be justified for serious offenders, and the nature and length of
sentences should be determined by the principle of proportionality – that is, the
theory that hardship caused by the penalty should match the suffering caused
by the offense. 45
Reconfiguring the objectives of sentencing and the standard penalties for
offenses would profoundly change the sentencing landscape. It would also result in a significant diminution in prison numbers.
The focus on structural aspects of the sentencing system is, however, insufficient to provide a total solution to the incarceration crisis. In any system,
an integral element of its success is the manner in which it is implemented. For
example, even if sentencing reform resulted in lower maximum penalties, its
effectiveness would nevertheless be compromised if innocent defendants felt
pressured to plead guilty or if defendants often accepted penalties more punitive than they would have received if they had insisted on a trial. The need for
a fair and efficient plea bargaining system is thus cardinal to the functioning of
a fair and efficient sentencing system.
Prior to setting out the parameters of a fairer plea bargaining process, we
explain in more detail the reason why wide-ranging sentencing reform is urgently needed by providing an overview of the harm caused by the mass incarceration crisis.
39. See generally Mirko Bagaric & Sandeep Gopalan, Saving the United States
from Lurching to Another Sentencing Crisis: Taking Proportionality Seriously and Implementing Fair Fixed Penalties, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 169 (2016).
40. Id. at 171, 284.
41. Id. at 184.
42. Id. at 187.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 185.
45. Id. at 189.
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B. The Staggering Financial and Humanistic Toll of Imprisonment
There are two major forms of harm stemming from the current incarceration crisis. Both are enormous in magnitude. The first is financial. The other
is humanistic. We consider them in that order.
The current incarceration crisis costs taxpayers an estimated $80 billion
per year directly 46 and rises to more than $500 billion when account is taken
of the additional social costs. 47 In most states, the budget allocated to corrections is exceeded only by Medicaid and education expenditures, 48 and in some
it exceeds the education expenditure. 49 The increase in the corrections budget
is to be contrasted with the slow down or contraction of expenditures on other
key social services. 50
Notwithstanding this dramatic increase in expenditure, the resulting increase in incarceration rates has not produced any significant community benefit. Importantly, it has not enhanced community safety. 51 Studies have repeatedly demonstrated that increasing incarceration plays a very limited role in

46. KEARNEY ET AL., supra note 21, at 13.
47. Michael McLaughlin et al., The Economic Burden of Incarceration in the U.S.

19 (Concordance Inst. for Advancing Justice & Research Working Paper #AJI072016,
2016), https://joinnia.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/The-Economic-Burden-of-Incarceration-in-the-US-2016.pdf.
48. THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 23, at
314; see also KEARNEY ET AL., supra note 21, at 13.
49. See MITCHELL & LEACHMAN, supra note 35, at 1. Reduced investment in education is also occurring at the more junior education level:
In recent years . . . states have cut education funding, in some cases by large
amounts. At least 30 states are providing less general funding per student this
year for K-12 schools than in state fiscal year 2008, before the Great Recession
hit, after adjusting for inflation. In 14 states, the reduction exceeds 10%. The
3 states with the deepest funding cuts since the recession hit –Alabama, Arizona, and Oklahoma – are among the ten states with the highest incarceration
rates.

Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Beatrice Gitau, The Hidden Costs of Funding Prisons
Instead of Schools, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2015/1003/The-hidden-costs-of-funding-prisons-instead-ofschools (“[Eleven states] spend more on prisons than universities: Michigan, Oregon,
Arizona, Vermont, Colorado, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Delaware, Rhode Island,
Massachusetts, and Connecticut”); Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America, NEW
YORKER (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/the-caging-of-america (observing that the rate of investment in prisons has significantly exceeded that of higher education).
50. THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 23, at
314; see also KEARNEY ET AL., supra note 21, at 13.
51. KEARNEY ET AL., supra note 21, at 18–19.
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decreasing crime. 52 In more than half of the states in the United States, there
is evidence of a positive correlation between reduced rates of imprisonment
and a reduction in crime. 53 This is most clearly demonstrated in Texas, where
the incarceration rate fell by seventeen percent and the crime rate dropped by
twenty-seven percent between 2007 and 2015. 54
The expense of mass incarceration cannot, therefore, be justified by reference to any measurable community benefit. In addition to the fiscal burden
of incarceration, there is also a less obvious but perhaps even greater humanistic toll. Incarceration exacts an extreme toll not only on prisoners but also on
their family and dependents. 55 Mass incarceration may also violate human
rights, 56 particularly of minorities and others from socially and economicallydeprived backgrounds who are over-represented in the prison system. 57
52. See, e.g., JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., HOW MANY
AMERICANS ARE UNNECESSARILY INCARCERATED 5, 22 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Unnecessarily_Incarcerated_0.pdf. See generally the studies summarized in Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime
– Not the Prior Convictions of the Person That Committed the Crime: An Argument for
Less Impact Being Accorded to Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 343 (2014).
53. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 5. The aim of lower incarceration numbers and less crime is readily achievable. See DANIELLE SERED, VERA INST. JUST.
ACCOUNTING FOR VIOLENCE: HOW TO INCREASE SAFETY AND BREAK OUR FAILED
RELIANCE ON MASS INCARCERATION 8 (2017), https://storage.googleapis.com/veraweb-assets/downloads/Publications/accounting-for-violence/legacy_downloads/accounting-for-violence.pdf.
54. Tina Rosenberg, Opinion, Even in Texas, Mass Imprisonment Is Going Out of
Style, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/opinion/even-in-texas-mass-imprisonment-is-going-out-of-style.html?_r=0; see also Matt
Thompson, Imagining the Presence of Justice, ATLANTIC (May 3, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2017/05/criminal-justice-across-america-reporting-project/524985/ (observing the “startling divergence between crime and
punishment” in the United States).
55. McLaughlin et al., supra note 47, at 2.
56. See Mirko Bagaric, Three Things That a Baseline Study Shows Don’t Cause
Indigenous Over-Imprisonment; Three Things that Might but Shouldn’t and Three Reforms that Will Reduce Indigenous Over-Imprisonment, 32 HARV. J. ON RACIAL &
ETHNIC JUST. 103, 104 (2016) [hereinafter Bagaric, Three Things] (“Due to the extreme
nature of [racial] disparities Australia has been harshly condemned by the international
human rights community.”); cf. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May
23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing (discussing racial bias the United States criminal justice system).
57. See generally Bagaric, Three Things, supra note 56; Mirko Bagaric, Rich Offender; Poor Offender: Why It (Sometimes) Matters in Sentencing, 33 LAW & INEQ. 1
(2015). However, it should be noted that in recent years there has been a slight reduction in the extent to which African Americans are imprisoned compared to the rest of
the community, but nevertheless, their over-imprisonment rate is more than 5:1. See
Keith Humphreys, Black Incarceration Hasn’t Been this Low in a Generation, WASH.
POST (Aug. 16, 2016),
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The pain of imprisonment is not restricted to the deprivation of liberty. It
frequently extends to mental and physical harm. Harms take the form of sexual
and physical abuse, which is inflicted on inmates at substantially higher rates
than members of the general community. 58 Added to this is the restriction of
access to goods, services, 59 and sexual relationships, 60 as well as the emotional
harm associated with the lack of any meaningful family contact. 61 The pain
extends beyond the expiration of the prison term, with former prisoners suffering reduced employment prospects, 62 life expectancy, 63 and disproportionate
levels of ill health. 64
The burden of incarceration also extends to families and other dependents
of prisoners and is most acutely felt by children. 65 It is perhaps not surprising
that children who have had a parent imprisoned often experience significant

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/08/16/black-incarcerationhasnt-been-this-low-in-a-generation/. The reasons that black Americans are imprisoned at greater levels are discussed infra Part V; see also Angwin et al., supra note 56.
58. See Cheryl Bell et al., Rape and Sexual Misconduct in the Prison System: Analyzing America’s Most “Open” Secret, YALE L. & POL’Y REV 195, 208–09 (1999).
59. GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM
SECURITY PRISON 67–68 (2007).
60. Id. at 70–71; see also Robert Johnson & Hans Toch, Introduction to THE PAINS
OF IMPRISONMENT (Robert Johnson & Hans Toch eds., 1982).
61. SYKES, supra note 59, at 70–71.
62. THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 23, at
247. One study estimated the earnings reduction to be as high as forty percent. Bruce
Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, 139 DAEDALUS 8, 13
(2010).
63. Anne C. Spaulding et al., Prisoner Survival Inside and Outside of the Institution: Implications for Health-Care Planning, 173 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 479, 479
(2011). A study which examined the 15.5-year survival rate of 23,510 ex-prisoners in
the State of Georgia found much higher mortality rates for ex-prisoners than for the rest
of the population. Id. There were 2,650 deaths in total, which was a forty-three percent
higher mortality rate than normally expected – 799 more ex-prisoners died than expected. Id. The main causes for the increased mortality rates were homicide, transportation accidents, accidental poisoning – which included drug overdoses – and suicide.
See id.; see also THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note
23, at 219–26.
64. Christopher Wildeman & Emily A. Wang, Mass Incarceration, Public Health,
and Widening Inequality in the USA, 389 LANCET 1464, 1464 (2017).
65. See Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, First-Time Offender, Productive Offender, Offender with Dependents: Why the Profile of Offenders (Sometimes) Matters
in Sentencing, 78 ALB. L. REV. 397, 432 (2015). For a discussion about the meaning
of flourishing, see Mirko Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage that is Proportionality in Sentencing, 25 N.Z. U. L. REV. 411, 434 (2013) [hereinafter Bagaric, Injecting
Content into the Mirage that is Proportionality in Sentencing].
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emotional problems and negative health outcomes, 66 tend to attend and participate less in school, suffer from reduced parental oversight, 67 and, as a result,
have an increased risk of offending themselves. 68

C. Widespread Support for Sentencing Reform
The reforms proposed in this Article are admittedly wide-ranging and extensive. However, this is not necessarily a compelling reason for not advocating such changes. In fact, the sentencing landscape is currently more receptive
to change than at any time in recent history. Recognition of the need for sentencing reform is reflected in the increased attention devoted to the subject by
journalists, 69 politicians from both sides of the aisle, 70 and the broader community, 71 including the academic and legal communities. Police officials, prose-

66. Wildeman & Wang, supra note 64, at 1469.
67. DAVID MURPHEY & P. MAE COOPER, PARENTS BEHIND BARS: WHAT HAPPENS

THEIR CHILDREN? 2 (2015), https://childtrends-ciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpathdns.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/2015-42ParentsBehindBars.pdf.
68. E. Mosely, Incarcerated – Children of Parents in Prison Impacted, TEX. DEP’T
CRIM. JUST. (July 2008), http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/gokids/gokids_articles_children_impacted.html. This study found that children of parents who have been imprisoned are five times more likely than other children to commit offenses.
69. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, In the U.S., Punishment Comes Before the Crimes,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/business/economy/in-the-us-punishment-comes-before-the-crimes.html; Matt Ferner, New Report
Reveals Devastating Effects of Mass Incarceration on the U.S., HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 5, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/entry/effects-mass-incarceration_us_5727b6abe4b0b49df6ac0e00. The New York Times has published multiple editorials endorsing sentencing reform. See, e.g., Opinion, Cut Prison Sentences, and
Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/24/opinion/sunday/cutting-prison-sentences-and-costs.html; Opinion, Cut Sentences for Low-Level
Drug Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/23/opinion/cut-sentences-for-low-level-drug-crimes.html; Opinion, Toward Saner, More Effective Prison Sentences, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/opinion/sunday/toward-saner-more-effective-prison-sentences.html; Rosenberg, supra note 54.
70. Clare Foran, What Can the U.S. Do About Mass Incarceration?, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/ending-mass-incarceration/475563/.
71. Several prominent reports also continue to emphasize the urgent need for sentencing reform to reduce levels of incarceration. See, e.g., SERED, supra note 53, at 8;
see also Holly Harris & Andrew Howard, Ryan’s Victory Trumps Justice Reform Opponents, HILL (Aug. 15, 2006), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/crime/291500ryans-victory-trumps-justice-reform-opponents. Harris and Howard refer to polling
data showing “overwhelming support across the political and ideological spectrum for
criminal justice reform.” Id. But see Justin McCarthy, Americans’ Views Shift on
Toughness of Justice System, GALLUP (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/196568/americans-views-shift-toughness-justice-system.aspx.
TO
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cutors, and attorneys general have also pleaded for reductions in rates of incarceration, most notably through the Law Enforcement Leaders to Reduce Crime
and Incarceration initiative. 72 Even more telling, however, is the fact that many
victims of crime – including violent crime – have called for less spending on
prison and a greater focus on rehabilitation. 73
Recognizing the broad support for sentencing reform and the desirability
of reducing the rate of mass incarceration, the Obama Administration, in 2014,
amended the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to significantly reduce the penalty
for many non-violent drug trafficking offenses. 74 The change operated retrospectively, 75 resulting in a penalty reduction of approximately two years for
13,000 federal prisoners and saving around one billion dollars. 76

72. Press Release, Law Enforcement Leaders, Law Enforcement Leaders Urge
President to Back Sentencing Reform, Spurn More Incarceration as Part of Anti-Crime
Agenda (Feb. 13, 2017), http://lawenforcementleaders.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/LEL-Report-Release.pdf. In 2017, this body, comprised of nearly 200
police chiefs and prosecutors, issued a press release urging the Trump Administration
to implement policies designed to reduce incarceration by targeting resources to preventing violent crime instead of “over-resourcing efforts to fight lower-level drug
crimes and non-violent crimes.” Id.; see also Douglas A. Berman, Notable New Group
Advocating for Sentencing Reforms: Law Enforcement Leaders to Reduce Crime and
Incarceration, SENTENCING L. & POL’Y (Oct. 21, 2015), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2015/10/notable-new-group-advocating-for-sentencing-reforms-law-enforcement-leaders-to-reduce-crime-and-inca.html.
73. Christopher Ingraham, Even Violent Crime Victims Say Our Prisons Are Making Crime Worse, WASH. POST (Aug 5. 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/08/05/even-violent-crime-victims-say-our-prisonsare-making-crime-worse/; see also Timothy Williams, Trump Wants to Get Tough on
Crime. Victims Don’t Agree., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/us/crime-victims-poll-trump-agenda.html.
74. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION 2014 DRUG
GUIDELINES AMENDMENT RETROACTIVITY DATA REPORT (2016),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/retroactivity-analyses/drug-guidelines-amendment/20161025-DrugRetro-Analysis.pdf.
75. Id.
76. Douglas A. Berman, US Sentencing Commission Releases New Data on Retroactive Application of “Drugs -2” Guideline Amendment, SENTENCING L. & POL’Y
(Aug. 17, 2016),
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2015/08/us-sentencingcommission-releases-new-data-on-retroactive-application-of-drugs-2-guidelineamendment.html.
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This trend at the federal level does not, however, appear likely to continue, 77 with both President Trump 78 and former Attorney-General Jeff Sessions 79 appearing to embrace a ‘tough on crime’ approach to law enforcement
and sentencing. This is the case notwithstanding the fact that some Republicans have recommended reform to reduce prison numbers because they recognize the increasing unpopularity of a “tough on crime” approach and, in particular, the fact that many large conservative states have been leading the reform
agenda. 80 In addition, in December 2018, the Trump Administration passed
77. This is the case notwithstanding the establishment of a “Task Force on Crime
Reduction and Public Safety” in February 2017, designed, in part, to identify “deficiencies in existing laws that have made them less effective in reducing crime and propose
new legislation that could be enacted to improve public safety and reduce crime.” Exec.
Order No. 13,776, 82 Fed. Reg. 10,699 (Feb. 9, 2017). For an overview of the Trump
Administration’s activity in this area in his first 100 days, see AMES GRAWERT &
NATASHA CAMHI, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN PRESIDENT TRUMP’S
FIRST 100 DAYS (2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Criminal_Justice_in_President_Trumps_First_100_Days.pdf.
78. President Trump has long been an advocate of “tough on crime” policies. For
example, he devotes a chapter of his book, The America We Deserve, to advocating
tough on crime policies. Donald Trump, The Safe Streets We Deserve, in THE AMERICA
WE DESERVE ch. 3 (St. Martin’s Press, 2000). This rhetoric continued through the primaries and into to his first few months in office. See generally German Lopez, Trump’s
First 100 Days Have Been a Criminal Justice Callback to the 1980s and ‘90s, VOX
(Apr. 28, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/4/28/15457902/trump-criminal-justice-100-days; Jenna Goff & Joan Greve, Trump vs. Clinton: Criminal Justice Reform,
PBS (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/weta/washingtonweek/blog-post/trump-vsclinton-criminal-justice-reform; Michelle Mark, Here’s What Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump Think About Criminal Justice, BUS. INSIDER AUSTL. (Sept. 27, 2016),
http://www.businessinsider.com.au/trump-and-clinton-on-issues-mass-incarcerationand-criminal-justice-2016-9.
79. President Trump appointed Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who also supported a “tough on crime” approach, evidenced in part by the release of a recent memorandum requiring federal prosecutors to “charge and pursue the most serious, readily
provable offense.” Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Attorney General to All Federal
Prosecutors
1
(May
10,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download. The impact of this in terms of increasing incarceration
numbers in one jurisdiction was discussed in Aaron Cantú, Two Steps Back: How Jeff
Sessions’ Memo on Federal Prosecutions Could Take New Mexico Back to a Harsher
Era, SANTA FE REP. (May 16, 2017), http://www.sfreporter.com/santafe/article-13419two-steps-back.html. However, Sessions was fired in November of 2018, and Trump
“named Matthew Whitaker to serve as interim attorney general.” Kevin Johnson,
Trump Fires Jeff Sessions, Names Matthew Whitaker as Interim Attorney General,
USA TODAY (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/11/07/jeff-sessions-resigns-attorney-general-trump/512600001/.
80. See, e.g., Harris & Howard, supra note 71. Harris and Howard have observed,
for example, that “Speaker Ryan’s home state of Wisconsin show[s] support for reform
issues ranging from the 60s to high 80s. The smart political play is to embrace these
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the First Step Act, which aims to reduced federal prison numbers by implementing a number of reforms, including reducing penalties for certain drug offenses and facilitating for the earlier release of some prisoners. 81
Notwithstanding the fact that it appears unlikely that, in the short term,
positive sentencing reform will occur at the federal level, there is still the prospect that significant change can be made at the state level. With seven out of
eight prisoners held in state prisons, 82 it is the states that can do the most to
reduce current levels of mass incarceration, and many have already embarked
on efforts to do so. During 2014 and 2015, for example, forty-six states passed
laws directed at reducing prison populations through sentencing reform, 83 including, in some states, reducing terms of prison sentences for property and
reforms. Doing otherwise could backfire.” Id.; see also Evan Halper, Clinton’s Call
for Easing Harsh Sentencing Laws Is Echoed by Republican Rivals, L.A. TIMES (Apr.
29,
2015),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/la-pn-clinton-prison-reform20150429-story.html; Peter Baker, 2016 Candidates Are United in Call to Alter Justice
System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/28/us/politics/being-less-tough-on-crime-is-2016-consensus.html. Perhaps more notably, a recent poll suggests a majority of people who support President Trump believe judges
should have more freedom to impose sanctions other than imprisonment. Vikrant
Reddy, The Conservative Base Wants Criminal-Justice Reform, NAT’L REV. (May 8,
2017), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/447398/criminal-justice-reform-donaldtrump-supporters-conservative-base-want-fresh. There was some optimism that President Trump would support legislation aimed at reducing federal prison numbers, but
this momentum seems to have dissipated. See Stef W. Kight & Jonathan Swan, Trump
Won’t Endorse Criminal Justice Bill Before Midterms, AXIOS (Aug. 24, 2018),
https://www.axios.com/trump-criminal-justice-reform-bill-2018-midterms--7898f16f0fcb-4ad0-ae44-f0131e406b22.html.
81. For an overview of this legislation see Brandon Sample, First Step Act: A
Comprehensive Analysis, SENTENCING.NET (Dec. 19, 2018), https://sentencing.net/legislation/first-step-act.
82. Rosenberg, supra note 54.
83. REBECCA SILBER, RAM SUBRAMANIAN & MAIA SPOTTS, VERA INST. JUST.,
JUSTICE IN REVIEW: NEW TRENDS IN STATE SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 2014–
2015, at 3, 6–7 (2016),
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/justice-in-review-new-trends-in-state-sentencing-and-corrections-2014-2015/legacy_downloads/state-sentencing-and-corrections-trends-2014-2015-updated.pdf. Wide-ranging
reforms are occurring in Ohio and Michigan. See U.S. JUSTICE ACTION NETWORK,
REFORMING THE NATION’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE IMPACT OF 2015 AND
PROSPECTS FOR 2016, at 9–10 (2015). Texas is also undertaking sweeping criminal
justice reforms. See Adam Bradon et al., Congress Should Follow the Red States’ Lead
on Criminal-Justice Reform, NAT’L REV. (May 2, 2016), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/434783/criminal-justice-reform-conservatives-have-led-way. For a
summary of recent changes in some states to lower penalties for property, drunk driving, and other low-level offenders, see Sarah Breitenbach, Prisons, Policing at Forefront of State Criminal Justice Action, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (June 27, 2016),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/06/27/prisons-policing-at-forefront-of-state-criminal-justice-action; Brandon L. Garrett, Conservatives Are Leading the Way as States Enact Criminal Justice Reform, SLATE (Mar.
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drug offenses 84 and re-classifying certain non-violent offenses as misdemeanors. 85 Reforms adopted by Texas have reduced prisoner numbers by more than
31, 2017),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/trials_and_error/2017/03/conservatives_could_help_derail_trump_s_tough_on_crime_policies.html; Richard A. Oppel
Jr., States Trim Penalties and Prison Rolls, Even as Sessions Gets Tough, N.Y. TIMES
(May 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/us/states-prisons-crime-sentences-jeff-sessions.html; James Foreman Jr., Opinion, Justice Springs Eternal, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/25/opinion/sunday/justicesprings-eternal.html.
84. SILBER, SUBRAMANIAN & SPOTTS, supra note 83, at 3, 19–20; see also Bill
Keller, Nine Lessons About Criminal Justice Reform, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 19,
2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/07/19/nine-lessons-about-criminaljustice-reform#.LWnzhH89W.
85. One such measure was California Proposition 47. This law brings about the
following key changes: it “requires misdemeanor sentence instead of felony for certain
drug possession offenses” and “for the following crimes when amount involved is $950
or less: petty theft, receiving stolen property, and forging/writing bad checks”; it
“[a]llows felony sentence for these offenses if person has previous conviction for
crimes such as rape, murder, or child molestation or is registered sex offender;”; and it
“requires resentencing for persons serving felony sentences for these offenses unless
court finds unreasonable public safety risk.” CAL. ATTORNEY GENERAL, PROPOSITION
47: CRIMINAL SENTENCES. MISDEMEANOR PENALTIES. INITIATIVE STATUTE. 1 (2014),
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/pdf/proposition-47-title-summary-analysis.pdf.
The law was passed with a majority of fifty-nine percent of voters in favor. Kristina
Davis, Calif Cuts Penalties for Small Drug Crimes, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Nov. 4,
2014),
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/elections/sdut-prop-47-misdemeanorlaw-vote-election-drug-2014nov04-story.html; see also San Francisco Called a Model
for Ending Mass Incarceration, CRIME REP. (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/articles/2015-12-san-francisco-called-a-model-for-ending-massincarce. For an overview of the impact of the reform, see Rob Kuznia, An Unprecedented Experiment in Mass Forgiveness, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/an-unprecedented-experiment-in-mass-forgiveness/2016/02/08/45899f9c-a059-11e5-a3c5-c77f2cc5a43c_story.html. This was
followed by Proposition 57 in November 2016, which allows prisoners to be released
earlier and which is likely to result in the release of 9,500 prisoners in four years and a
seven percent reduction in the prison population in California. California Plans to Free
9,500 Inmates over Next 4 Years, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-california-inmates-20170324story.html. Louisiana is also undertaking considerable criminal justice reform. See
Julia O’Donoghue, Louisiana to Review 16,000 Prison Sentences as Criminal Justice
Reform Takes Effect, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 16, 2017), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/08/louisiana_sentence_changes.html; Julia O’Donoghue, Louisiana May be Poised to Pass ‘Historic’ Criminal Justice Reform, Reduce Prison Population, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 16, 2017),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/05/louisiana_looks_poised_to_pass.html. One state – North Dakota – is even going so far as to
experiment with the structure of prisons and adopting the Norwegian model of humanistic prisons in a bid to ascertain whether this will correlate with less recidivism.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 5

18

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

10,000 since 2011 and have resulted in an unprecedented plan to close four
prisons in 2017. 86
Nevertheless, these changes and proposals, while commendable, are
piecemeal and have had only a minor impact on incarceration levels. A fundamental overhaul of sentencing is needed to ensure that the system operates
fairly and efficiently. The system must, while maintaining community safety
as an important goal, ensure offenders are punished in proportion to the seriousness of their offenses and eliminate gratuitous punishment. Such an approach would reduce the burden on the public purse and limit the harm often
needlessly suffered by offenders and their families. 87
There is, as we have shown, considerable support for sentencing reform. 88
In light of that support, and the harm – fiscal and humanistic – associated with
the current system, we now examine the role of prosecutorial conduct in the
sentencing system and make suggestions for reforming the sentencing and, in
particular, plea bargaining process.

Dashka Slater, North Dakota’s Norway Experiment: Can Humane Prisons Work in
America? A Red State Aims to Find Out, MOTHER JONES (July/Aug. 2017),
http://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2017/07/north-dakota-norway-prisons-experiment/.
86. Brandy Grissom, With Crime, Incarceration Rates Falling, Texas Closes Record Number of Prisons, DALL. MORNING NEWS (July 5, 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas-legislature/2017/07/05/crime-incarceration-rates-fallingtexas-closes-record-number-lock-ups. As a result of a variety of measures, including
investing in diversion programs, initiatives to assist those suffering mental illness, and
a reduction in some penalties, the prison population in Texas has dropped by around
10,000 prisoners. Id.
87. See Thompson, supra note 54. As noted recently,
Despite dawning awareness of the deep social and economic costs of mass incarceration, no one-size-fits-all solution exists to change this picture. Rolling
back mass incarceration while protecting public safety will require a legion of
efforts in thousands of prosecutors’ offices, police departments, parole boards,
and legislative chambers. “What we have is not a system at all,” as Fordham
University’s John Pfaff told The Atlantic’s Matt Ford, “but a patchwork of competing bureaucracies with different constituencies, different incentives, who oftentimes might have similar political ideologies, but very different goals and
very different pressures on them.”

Id.

88. See supra notes 71–73, 80 and accompanying text. It should be noted that not
all of the momentum is towards less incarceration. Senator Cotton has recently stated
that the United States is suffering from “under-incarceration.” See Nick Gass, Sen. Tom
Cotton: U.S. Has ‘Under-Incarceration Problem’, POLITICO (May 19, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/05/tom-cotton-under-incarceration-223371.
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II. THE CURRENT PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS
A. Overview and Advantages of the Plea Bargaining Process
Plea bargaining is the process by which defendants give up their right to
trial and instead plead guilty in exchange for concessions from the prosecution,
generally in the form of withdrawal of charges or lighter sentences. 89 Plea
bargaining is a multifaceted process that usually involves discussions and negotiation between the criminal defendant, his attorney, and the prosecutor. All
negotiations take place directly between the parties without the involvement of
a neutral – the judge assigned to the case is (typically) completely barred from
participating in plea negotiations. 90
Discussions in the bargaining process can focus on any aspect of the case,
including what charges the State will elect to bring, what facts will be included
in the agreement, and what proposed sentence will be submitted to the judge. 91
Lawyers, not judges, play the primary role in plea negotiations. 92 Defense and
89. Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 61, 66 (2015). The history of the process has been described as follows:
Plea bargains were almost unheard of prior to the Civil War. Only in its aftermath, as waves of displaced Americans and immigrants rolled into cities and
crime rates climbed, did appellate courts start documenting exchanges that resemble the modern practice. The plea became a release valve for mounting
caseloads. Appellate courts “all condemned it as shocking and terrible” at the
time, said Albert Alschuler, a retired law professor who has studied plea bargains for five decades. The courts raised a range of objections to these early
encounters, from the secretiveness of the process to the likeliness of coercing
innocent defendants. Pleas, wrote the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1877, are
“hardly, if at all, distinguishable in principle from a direct sale of justice.” The
practice nonetheless continued, and, by the turn of the century, a minor economy had settled in its orbit. “Fixers” could be hired to arrange for alternatives
to a prison sentence. Police regularly toured jails to “negotiate” with the inmates. One New York City defense attorney and friend to local magistrates
loitered in front of night court hawking [ten] days in jail for $300, 20 days for
$200, and 30 days for $150. By the 1920s, as violations of the federal liquor
prohibition flooded court dockets, 88% percent of cases in New York City and
85% percent in Chicago were settled through pleas. When the Supreme Court
in 1969 finally heard a case concerning the legality of the issue, it unanimously
ruled that pleas are constitutionally acceptable. They are ‘inherent in the criminal law and its administration,’ the Court declared.

Walsh, supra note 8.
90. Brook et al., supra note 5, at 1164. The limited, if not entirely non-existent,
role of the trial judge in the plea bargaining process is consistent between the federal
and state jurisdictions. 2 Criminal Law Advocacy § 37.04 (2017). For the most part,
it appears that the widespread bar on judicial involvement in the plea bargaining process
is a product of judicial practice, not constitutional prohibition. See id.
91. Brook et al., supra note 5, at 1164–67.
92. Id. at 1182.
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prosecution lawyers may meet outside the presence of the defendant, with the
defense attorney relaying the substance of the discussions back to his or her
client. 93 Alternatively, the negotiations may take the form of proffer sessions
with the lawyers, clients, and law enforcement agents all present. 94
One tack that the prosecution may take in the negotiation process is the
use of charge bargaining. Broadly, charge bargaining is the process whereby
the prosecution agrees to drop certain charges in exchange for the defendant’s
guilty plea on other charges. 95 In rare cases, the prosecution and the defendant
will come to an agreement under which all pending charges against the defendant are dropped or no charges are brought at all. 96 Further, in some instances
the prosecution will withdraw certain charges against the defendant where the
defendant would face mandatory consequences in subsequent collateral proceedings if found guilty of the to-be-dismissed charges. 97 However, in the
more typical case, the prosecution will agree to reduce the number of charges
brought, charge less serious offenses, or dismiss certain charges against the
defendant in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea. 98
Alternatively (and often in conjunction with charge bargaining), the prosecution may employ sentence bargaining to encourage the defendant to enter a
guilty plea. Sentence bargaining is the process whereby the prosecution and
defendant agree, and the prosecution recommends to the court, that the defendant will receive a specified sentence or a sentence within a specified range,
which is less onerous than the sentence that the defendant would have otherwise received had he or she been found guilty following a trial. 99 With sentence bargaining, the prosecution has a wide array of tools at its disposal. The
prosecution can agree to recommend a particular sentence or particular sentence range (in federal cases or states with analogous sentencing guidelines),
to suggest that a sentence be reduced by a fixed percentage, or to refrain from
opposing a particular sentence requested by the defendant. 100 Finally, the prosecution may offer the defendant the possibility of using a particular section of

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
In re Ellis, 356 F.3d 1198, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 2004).
Brook et al., supra note 5, at 1165.
Id. at 1165–66 (noting that dismissal of charges relating to crimes that would
count as crimes of “moral turpitude” in immigration courts may be used by the prosecution to incentivize defendants to plead guilty).
98. Id. at 1165.
99. John Gleeson, The Sentencing Commission and Prosecutorial Discretion: The
Role of the Courts in Policing Sentence Bargains, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 639, 639 (2008).
Ultimately, the court retains authority over whether to accept the plea on the terms
proposed and impose the prosecution-suggested sentence. Id.
100. Brook et al., supra note 5, at 1166.
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a sentencing guideline which, unlike the bulk of other plea agreements, 101 is
binding on the sentencing court once it accepts the bargained plea. 102
In the process of negotiating the plea, United States Attorneys (and other
prosecuting authorities for that matter) “have wide discretion in negotiating
guilty pleas . . . .” 103 One manner in which this discretion could be exercised
is by withdrawing more serious charges in exchange for a guilty plea even if
the prosecution’s case against the defendant on the dropped charge is strong. 104
However, at least in the federal jurisdiction, this typically does not occur. 105 In
federal criminal trials, prevailing practice dictates that United States Attorneys
pursue negotiations that will produce a guilty plea to the most serious charge
provable by the prosecution. The United States Attorney General set forth this
principle in a 2010 memorandum as follows:
Plea agreements should reflect the totality of a defendant’s conduct.
These agreements are governed by the same fundamental principle as
charging decisions: prosecutors should seek a plea to the most serious
offense that is consistent with the nature of defendant’s conduct and
likely to result in a sustainable conviction, informed by an individualized assessment of the specific facts and circumstances of each particular case. Charges should not be filed simply to exert leverage to induce
a plea, nor should charges be abandoned to arrive at a plea bargain that
does not reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct. 106

As alluded to above, the presiding trial judge, for the most part, plays no
role in the actual process of negotiating the plea. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate that “the court must not participate in [plea bargaining
discussions].” 107 As such, the judge, at least in the federal system, is almost
completely absent from the actual process of determining (in negotiations)
which charges a defendant will plead guilty to, which charges the prosecution
will drop, and what sentence is appropriate. 108 However, the judges retain the
role of manager of cases before the court and decide how much time to give

101. In most plea bargains, the court may impose a sentence other than what it recommended, even after accepting the agreement. See id.; see also 2 Criminal Law Advocacy § 37.04 (2017) (“If the judge does not accept the proposed agreement, the judge
must allow the defendant to withdraw the plea. If the defendant persists in his or her
guilty pleas, the judge may exceed the terms of the recommendation.”).
102. Brook et al., supra note 5, at 1166.
103. Id. at 1177.
104. In re Ellis, 356 F.3d 1198, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 2004).
105. Brook et al., supra note 5, at 1165.
106. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, to All Federal Prosecutors 2 (May 19, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/holder-memo-charging-sentencing.pdf.
107. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1).
108. Brook et al., supra note 5, at 1181–82.
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the parties to negotiate. 109 Most importantly, the judge retains ultimate control
over whether to accept or reject the plea ultimately produced as a result of the
negotiations. 110 As to the requirements that the judge must adhere to when
accepting or rejecting a plea agreement, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide comprehensive guidelines, and the federal guidelines are illustrative of what judges must do in both the federal and state systems alike. 111
Rule 11 mandates that the court “address the defendant personally in open
court” to make sure that the defendant understands the consequences of pleading guilty. 112 Perhaps most significantly, the court must relay to the defendant
the important constitutional rights he or she is waiving by pleading guilty: his
or her right not to plead guilty (or to persist in that plea if he or she has already
so pleaded);113 his or her right to a trial by jury; 114 his or her right to be represented by counsel; 115 his or her right at trial to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses; his or her right to be protected from compelled self-incrimination; his or her right to testify and present evidence; and his or her right to
compel the attendance of witnesses. 116
In addition, the court must inform the defendant of the nature of each
charge he or she is pleading guilty to, the maximum possible penalty for each
charge, and the minimum possible penalty for each charge. 117 Further, the
court must also determine whether the plea is voluntary or whether it was induced by force, threats, or promises other than those contained in the plea
agreement. 118 Finally, the court must ensure that there is sufficient factual basis for the plea. 119 Although this final requirement is generally satisfied by
asking the prosecution to read aloud the factual basis set forth in the plea agreement and then asking the defendant to confirm whether he or she agrees with
the facts as written, some courts require that defendants state in open court
precisely what acts they performed. 120
Courts may reject a defendant’s proposed guilty plea for a number of reasons. For instance, the court may conclude that the defendant cannot execute
a valid waiver of their constitutional rights, the factual basis is inadequate, or
the prosecution made promises to the defendant other than those contained in
the plea agreement itself. While there appears to be numerous bases for rejection of a plea, the reality is that nearly all plea agreements are in fact accepted
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id. at 1182–83.
Id. at 1184–85; see id. at 1182–83.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1).
Id. 11(b)(1)(B).
Id. 11(b)(1)(C).
Id. 11(b)(1)(D).
Id. 11(b)(1)(E).
Id. 11(b)(1)(G)–(I).
Id. 11(b)(2).
Id. 11(b)(3).
Brook et al., supra note 5, at 1176.
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by the courts. 121 This is an almost inevitable by-product of the fact that bargaining occurs outside the presence of the court; courts know very little about
the case, and there are considerable time pressures to process criminal matters. 122 In the rare instances that the court does reject guilty pleas, the court
must, on the record and in open court, tell the parties that the plea is rejected,
advise the defendant that the court is not obligated to follow the plea agreement, provide the defendant with an opportunity to withdraw the plea, and inform the defendant that if the plea is not withdrawn, the defendant may be
treated less favorably than under the plea agreement. 123
In terms of its degree of utilization and ability to reach an agreed outcome,
the plea bargaining process is an outstanding success. The overwhelming majority of criminal offenses are resolved pursuant to a plea bargain. The figure
is estimated to be between ninety and ninety-five percent. 124 In the end, plea
bargaining results in concluded agreements because both parties are incentivized to resolve criminal matters without proceeding to trial. From the State’s
perspective, the advantages are savings in court time and resources, sparing
witnesses the time and anxiety of attending court, and providing a degree of
certainty in the outcome of cases. 125 From the defendant’s perspective, the key
advantage of plea bargaining is that it provides a means of risk mitigation. Defendants are able to secure an outcome that is better than the sentence they
would have received if they were found guilty after going to trial.

B. Problems with the Plea Bargaining Process
Although the plea bargaining process normally produces an agreement,
there are profound problems associated with the process. In short, while the
plea bargaining process is, at least in abstract terms, portrayed as a negotiating
process, the reality is otherwise. A negotiation requires at least an approximate
matching in bargaining power. This is not the situation with a plea bargain.
The defendant’s position is considerably compromised by the fact that he or
she is personally and profoundly invested in the outcome. Criminal sanctions
involve the deliberate infliction of pain and hardship on offenders; therefore,
defendants have much at stake in the process. Defendants are heavily motivated to reduce the level of suffering that can be inflicted on them by the criminal justice process. Prosecutors face no such risk. In addition to this, there is
typically an imbalance in resources. Approximately eighty percent of criminal
defendants cannot afford to hire an attorney. 126 As such, most defendants are
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id. at 1176–77.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(5)(A)–(C).
LINDSEY DEVERS, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING: RESEARCH SUMMARY 1
(2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf.
125. See generally Thea Johnson, Measuring the Creative Plea Bargain, 92 IND. L.
J. 901 (2017).
126. Jaeah Lee, Hannah Levintova & Brett Brownell, Charts: Why You’re in Deep
Trouble If You Can’t Afford a Lawyer, MOTHER JONES (May 6, 2013),
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represented by one of America’s innumerable over-burdened and under-staffed
public defender’s offices. 127 In contrast, prosecution offices are better funded
and resourced. 128 We now elaborate on the problems associated with the plea
bargaining process.
The key failing of the system is the negotiating power differential between the defendant and the prosecution. Dylan Walsh, a freelance writer undertaking research as part of the project “The Presence of Justice” sets out the
inordinate leverage available to prosecutors in the following terms:
Indeed, the only bargaining restriction placed on prosecutors is that they
cannot use illegal threats to secure a plea. “So if a prosecutor says, ‘I’ll
shoot you if you don’t plead guilty,’ then the plea is invalid,”
Alschuler[, a law professor who has studied plea bargaining for five
decades,] explained. “But if he threatens to charge someone with a
crime punishable by death at trial and the defendant pleads guilty, then
the plea is lawful.” Assuming they have probable cause, prosecutors
can even threaten to bring charges against a defendant’s family in order
to extract a plea. For instance, if a defendant’s spouse or sibling is complicit in drug trafficking – perhaps they took a call related to the case
– a prosecutor can offer to reduce or dismiss charges against the family
member if the defendant pleads guilty. This dynamic, combined with
national trends over the last 30 years favoring lengthy mandatory sentences, gives prosecutors inordinate leverage. 129

The imbalance of power in the plea bargaining process is so profound that
it has been asserted that it is rational for defendants to plead guilty. 130 The
realities of prison and the bail system, and the nearly unfettered power reposed
in prosecutors, often apply considerable persuasive force to those defendants
who do not have the resources to get out of jail on bail or take their cases to
trial. According to the Prison Policy Initiative, roughly 630,000 Americans are
in jail on any given day, and of these 630,000, approximately seventy percent

http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/public-defenders-gideon-supremecourt-charts/.
127. See generally CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES (2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf (reporting that sixty-six percent of federal felony defendants and
eighty-two percent of felony defendants in state court were represented by the public
defender’s office).
128. See John Pfaff, A Mockery of Justice for the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/30/opinion/a-mockery-of-justice-for-thepoor.html.
129. Walsh, supra note 8.
130. Yoffee, supra note 12 (referencing Maddy deLone, Executive Director of the
Innocence Project).
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of them (443,000) have not yet been convicted of a crime. 131 Of these 443,000,
many face charges that would not require further incarceration. 132 However,
these defendants often do not have enough money to get out of jail on bail and,
because each passing day in pre-trial detention often carries severe consequences (such as the loss of wages from working or the loss of a job for missing
work days), defendants may feel forced to plead guilty, even if they are innocent of the crime charged. 133 Further, prosecutors can use the threat of going
to trial to prevail upon a defendant to plead guilty. 134 With the so called ‘trial
penalty,’ defendants are informed that the prosecutor will levy more serious
charges if they elect to go to trial and press for stiffer sentences if they are
subsequently convicted. 135 While this threat lacks force for those defendants
who have the money and the wherewithal to put on a vigorous defense, all too
many defendants are simply incapable of doing so. Roughly eighty percent of
defendants are eligible for court-appointed attorneys, and many of these courtappointed attorneys are sourced from overworked and underfunded public defender’s offices. 136 For defendants with no option other than a public defender,
their defense is often limited to a cursory investigation of the facts followed by
quick plea negotiations. 137 Taken together, it is the rational choice for a defendant to plead guilty. 138 Many defendants cannot afford to remain in jail
indefinitely, and court-appointed attorneys often lack the resources to investigate defendants’ claims of innocence by seeking out all necessary witnesses
and compiling crucial evidence. Rather than languishing in jail awaiting the
uncertain outcome of a trial, defendants, many of whom are not guilty, presently dangerous, or afflicted by mental illness or addiction, cannot be faulted
for making a considered choice to plead guilty. 139
In a similar vein, it has been noted that
[t]he glut of plea bargaining and the pandemic waiver of [trial] rights
have rendered trial by jury an inconvenient artifact. And . . . [b]ecause
there is no judicial check on the enhanced mandatory minimums pros-

131. Yoffee, supra note 12; see also Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2017, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2017),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2017.html.
132. Yoffee, supra note 12.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. This style of defense has been bitterly described as “meet ‘em and greet
‘em and plead ‘em.” Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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ecutors can inject into a case, they can put enormous pressure on defendants to plead guilty. In many cases, only a daring risk-taker can
withstand that pressure. Most people buckle under it. 140

The pressure on defendants to plead guilty due to the imbalanced nature
of the plea bargain is an increasingly common criticism of the plea bargaining
system. The pressure is so intense that it sometimes results in even innocent
people pleading guilty. 141 It is, of course, very difficult to ascertain the portion
of innocent defendants who plead guilty (given that even guilty defendants
have an interest in maintaining their innocence), but some measure can be
gleaned from the fact that hundreds of people that have been exonerated initially pleaded guilty. Dylan Walsh has observed that
[i]f a defendant considers going to trial, a prosecutor might hang overhead some charge that carries a mandatory life sentence. A plea of
guilty might instead get eight years, or 10 years, “or pick a number,”
said Matt Sotorosen, a senior trial attorney at the Office of the San Francisco Public Defender. “Even if you have an innocent client, most don’t
want to take that chance. They’ll just take eight years. What if things
go south at trial?” The results of this lopsided calculus are evident in
data from the National Registry of Exonerations: Of 2,006 recorded exonerations since the project started keeping track in 1989, 362 of those,
or 18% percent, were based on guilty pleas. 142

Evidence shows that the plea bargaining process operates especially
harshly against defendants from deprived socio-economic backgrounds. 143 In
a recent study, Professor Carlos Berdejo of the Loyola Law School, Los Angeles has found that there are significant racial disparities in the plea bargaining

140. Brook et al., supra note 5, at 1194 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
Critics on the left and the right are coming to agree that our criminal-justice
system, now so reliant on plea bargaining, is broken. Among them is Jed S.
Rakoff, a United States district judge for the Southern District of New York,
who wrote about the abuses of plea bargains in 2014, in The New York Review
of Books. “A criminal justice system that is secret and government-dictated,”
he wrote, “ultimately invites abuse and even tyranny.” Some critics even argue
that the practice should be abolished. That’s what Tim Lynch, the former director of the Project on Criminal Justice at the libertarian Cato Institute, believes. The Framers adopted trials for a reason, he has argued, and replacing
them with plea bargains – for convenience, no less – is unconstitutional.

Yoffee, supra note 12.
141. Yoffee, supra note 12.
142. Walsh, supra note 8.
143. Christi Metcalfe & Ted Chiricos, Race, Plea, and Charge Reduction: An Assessment of Racial Disparities in the Plea Process, 35 JUST. Q. 223 (2018).
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process. 144 African Americans are twenty-five percent less likely to have their
principal charge dropped than white defendants. 145 Accordingly, white defendants who are initially charged with a felony are less likely to be convicted
of a felony than African Americans. 146 An earlier study by the Vera Institute
focusing on plea bargains in more than 200,000 cases in New York City during
2010 and 2011 found that African American defendants were nineteen percent
more likely to be offered plea deals that involved prison or jail time than white
defendants. 147 Further, African Americans were more than fourteen percent
more likely to be imprisoned for felony drug offenses and fifteen percent more
likely to be incarcerated for misdemeanor drug offenses and drug offenses
against the person. 148
There is a growing chorus of critics who have launched scathing attacks
on the plea bargaining process. As noted by editor Emily Yoffee, a district
court judge has stated that the plea bargaining process “is secret and government-dictated” and “ultimately invites abuse and even tyranny.” 149 An editorial in the Wall Street Journal noted that “this relentless growth in plea bargaining has sparked a backlash among lawyers, legal scholars[,] and judges
– evidenced by recent federal court decisions, including two from the [United
States] Supreme Court. Weighing on many critics is the possibility . . . that the
innocent could feel pressured into pleading guilty.” 150
Despite the manifest problems associated with plea bargaining, it is not
tenable to abolish it because it is a clear case of economic pragmatism prevailing over principle:
In theory, abolishing the use of plea bargains wouldn’t take much: Prosecutors would simply stop offering deals. That would be that, though
the massive influx of trials would jam courts. (Michelle Alexander,
author of The New Jim Crow, discussed defendants’ deliberately going
to trial and “crashing the courts” as a form of resistance to mass incarceration.) But both sides of the debate agree the odds of this happening
are infinitesimal. Even Alschuler, who throughout his career remained
one of the staunchest critics of plea bargaining, admitted in 2013 that

144. Carlos Berdejo, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining,
59 B.C. L. REV. 1187 (2018).
145. Id. at 1191.
146. See id.
147. Gene Demby, Study Reveals Worse Outcomes for Black and Latino Defendants, NPR (July 17, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/07/17/332075947/study-reveals-worseoutcomes-for-black-and-latino-defendants.
148. Id.
149. Yoffee, supra note 12.
150. Brook et al., supra note 5, at 1190 (quoting Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller,
Federal Guilty Pleas Soar as Bargains Trump Trials, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 23, 2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443589304577637610097206808).
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“the time for a crusade” had passed. Instead, he suggested people work
to make the criminal-justice system “less awful.” 151

Thus, plea bargaining is a highly-flawed system. Nevertheless, it is an
essential component of the criminal justice system. Given these realities, it is
imperative to improve the system in a manner that does not meaningfully undermine the advantages of the system, namely the cost and time savings to the
court and the community. We now advance a proposal which will achieve
these objectives.

III. REFORM PROPOSAL
A. The Thirty Percent Guilty Plea Discount – Utilizing the Australian
Model
The key proposal in this Article is that the plea bargaining process should
be fundamentally reformed. The fulcrum upon which this reform should be
based is a designated sentencing discount of up to thirty percent for defendants
that plead guilty. This should be supplemented by a higher discount (of up to
seventy-five percent) for defendants who plead guilty in circumstances where
the prosecution’s case against them is weak. The first proposal (the thirty percent discount) is based upon an existing system that operates in Australia. We
now discuss this first proposal in greater detail in the context of explaining the
Australian plea bargaining process. In the course of this discussion, we set out
the advantages of the proposal and how it would operate in the United States.
In doing so, we emphasize that the framework of the guilty plea discount is that
the court would determine the exact size of the discount and that generally the
discount would be the highest when the guilty plea is entered at a very early
stage of the criminal process.
As noted above, there are several different forms of negotiations that can
potentially occur relating to sentence. 152 The first is charge bargaining,
whereby the prosecutor and defendant agree for charges to be withdrawn or
changed in exchange for a guilty plea. This happens regularly in Australia.
However, sentence bargaining, which involves the prosecution and defense
agreeing that a specific sentence should be imposed, is not permissible in Australia. 153
The Australian courts have maintained a high degree of judicial oversight
and authority over sentencing decisions. The High Court of Australia, in Barbaro v The Queen, held that it was impermissible for the prosecution, at the
plea bargaining stage, to even make a submission to the court regarding the

151. Walsh, supra note 8.
152. See text accompanying notes 95–102.
153. R v Marshall [1981] VR 725 (Austl.); see also LJW v Western Australia [No

2], [2007] WASCA 275 (Austl.).
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appropriate sentence or even the range of sentences that was appropriate. 154
The Court gave several reasons for this prohibition. The first is that the prosecution’s view of the bounds of the appropriate sentence is supposedly a “statement of opinion,” 155 not a submission. Secondly, the Court stated that a prosecutor’s statement about the acceptable sentencing range is inappropriate because it could be erroneous. 156 The prosecution’s view is supposedly not “dispassionate” and is often based on assumed rather than actual facts. 157 Third,
the Court stated that if a judge imposes a sentence within the prosecution’s
range, it may suggest that “the sentencing judge has been swayed by the prosecution’s view of what punishment should be imposed.” 158
It has been argued that these rationales for disallowing prosecution submissions of sentencing ranges are flawed. 159 In short, most legal submissions
constitute an opinion regarding counsel’s interpretation of the law or relevant
facts, and the main purpose of such submissions is precisely to influence the
outcome of the case. 160 Despite these criticisms, the courts in Australia continue to have a high degree of control over all aspects of the sentencing process. 161 For the purposes of this Article, the main point to take from the prosecution and defense sentencing interaction is that the only negotiating that occurs between these parties concerns the offenses to which an accused will plead
guilty. Once a guilty plea is entered, it is then for the judge to determine the
penalty.
Although Australian prosecutors have no direct input into the exact sentence that a defendant will receive, defendants are nevertheless encouraged to
plead guilty because this will result in a penalty discount. Pleading guilty is a
mitigating factor in all Australian jurisdictions. 162
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

[2014] HCA 2, 65 (Austl.).
Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 33.
Id. ¶ 32.
Id. ¶ 33.
See generally Mirko Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness:
The Need to Abolish the Stain that Is the Instinctive Synthesis, 38 U.N.S.W. L. J. 76, 78
(2015).
160. Id. at 97–98.
161. Id. at 112.
162. In New South Wales, and Queensland, the Court must indicate if it does not
award a sentencing discount in recognition of a guilty plea. Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) § 22(2) (Austl.); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s
13(3)) (Austl.). In South Australia, Western Australia, and New South Wales, the
courts often specify the size of the discount given. In Victoria, section 6AAA of the
Sentencing Act 1991 states that when courts provide a discount for a plea of guilty, they
must specify the sentence that would have been given in the absence of that discount.
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 6AAA (Austl.). The rationale and size of the typical discount in Victoria is discussed in Phillips v The Queen [2012] VSCA 140 (Austl.). There
has been some judicial comment as to the artificiality of section 6AAA, given the instinctive synthesis that produces the actual sentence. See Scerri v The Queen [2010]
VSCA 287; R v Flaherty (No 2) [2008] VSC 270 (Austl.). In Western Australia, section
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The importance of the guilty plea discount is illustrated by the scope of
its operation. 163 Offenders receive a discount for pleading guilty, irrespective
of the reasons for the plea, largely on account of the utilitarian benefits associated with the plea. 164 The motivation for the plea of guilty is irrelevant. If
there is evidence that the guilty plea is motivated by remorse, this will result in
a larger reduction not because this relates to the guilty plea discount but because remorse is an independent mitigating factor. 165 Further, the availability
and magnitude of the discount does not depend on the strength of the prosecution’s case, and hence the full discount is available even when the evidence
against the defendant is compelling. 166
The guilty plea discount is regarded as such an important aspect of the
Australian sentencing system that it is one of only two sentencing considerations that attract a mathematical numerical discount. 167 While in some Australian jurisdictions this occurs as a matter of practice, in Victoria and Western

9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 permits a court to reduce a sentence by up to twentyfive percent for a plea entered into at the first reasonable opportunity. Sentencing Act
1995 (WA) s 9AA (Austl.). In South Australia, recent legislative changes allow for a
guilty plea reduction of up to forty percent for an early guilty plea. Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA), s 10C (Austl.). For a further discussion, see Elizabeth Wren
& Lorana Bartels, ‘Guilty, Your Honour’: Recent Legislative Developments on the
Guilty Plea Discount and an Australian Capital Territory Case Study on its Operation,
35 ADEL. L. REV. 361 (2014).
163. For a discussion of the guilty plea discount, see ARIE FREIBERG, FOX &
FREIBERG’S SENTENCING: STATE AND FEDERAL LAW IN VICTORIA 375–84 (3rd ed.
2014); GERALDINE MACKENZIE, PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING 91–94 (2010); STEPHEN
ODGERS, SENTENCE 325–36 (3rd ed. 2015).
164. The only exception to this is the federal jurisdiction, where section 16A(2) of
the Crimes Act 1914 states that in sentencing a court must take into account “if the
person has pleaded guilty to the charge in respect of the offence - that fact.” (Cth) s
16A(2)(g). This has been interpreted to justify a discount only to the extent that the
plea evinces a desire by the offender to “facilitate the course of justice.” Cameron v
The Queen [2002] HCA 6 (Austl.). Thus, a plea purely for expedient reasons does not
attract the discount. A relevant consideration in ascertaining the accused’s motive is
the strength of the prosecution’s case. A guilty plea in the context of a strong case can
attract no discount because it could be regarded as “a recognition of the inevitable.”
Tyler v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 247 [114] (Austl.).
165. See Phillips v The Queen [2012] VSCA 140 (Austl.); Morton v The Queen
[2014] NSWCCA 8 (Austl.); Fusimalohi v The Queen [2012] ACTCA 49 (Austl.); CD
v The Queen [2013] VSCA 95 (Austl.); Barbaro v The Queen [2012] VSCA 288
(Austl.).
166. See Phillips v The Queen [2012] VSCA 140 (Redlich JA and Curtin AJA)
(summarizing the key principles relating to the guilty plea discount). An extensive
summary of essentially the same principle is also set out in Morton v The Queen [2014]
NSWCCA 8. However, a greater discount may be provided if the plea confers considerable cost or other community savings. Id.
167. See generally MIRKO BAGARIC & RICHARD EDNEY, AUSTRALIAN SENTENCING:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 2017). The other is assisting authorities. Id.
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Australia, it is a statutory requirement that the discount be quantified. 168 The
quantitative discount for pleading guilty can be provided in two ways. First,
the court can set out the discount in percentage terms. Second, the judge can
set out the penalty that would have been imposed had the plea not been provided or promised. In the second instance, the percentage discount can be readily ascertained simply by comparing the prospective sentence with the actual
sentence. 169
While there is no precise or uniform discount for pleading guilty, the discount is normally considerable. The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Thomson issued a guideline judgment stating that a guilty plea will
generally be reflected in a ten to twenty-five percent reduction of a sentence. 170
Since that time, several jurisdictions have enacted statutory provisions to designate the appropriate range of guilty plea sentence discounts. Generally, the
range is similar to that stipulated in Thomson, but the penalty reduction for
pleading guilty can be up to thirty percent and even up to forty percent in South
Australia. 171 This discount does not incorporate the penalty reduction that is
accorded for disclosing one’s own offenses or those of others to authorities. 172
The most important variable regarding the size of the discount is the time of
plea; early pleas attract the greatest penalty reduction. 173 This is because they
confer the greatest benefit in terms of the amount of court time and resources
saved.
In reality, there is a degree of approximation in the courts’ application of
guilty plea discounts. This is for two main reasons. First, the impact of the
discount sometimes reduces the penalty from a prison term to a lesser sanction,
such as a fine or community-based order. Yet, there is no accepted methodology or even an approximate formula for substituting criminal sanctions. 174
Thus, when a court reduces a term of imprisonment to another type of sanction
as a result of a guilty plea, it is not feasible to ascertain the weight that has been
168. Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 6AA(1) (Austl.); Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s
9AA(5) (Austl.). The New South Wales Law Reform Commission has recommended
a transparent approach to the size of the guilty plea discount. NEW S. WALES L.
REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT 139, at 117 (2013), http://www.lawreform.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Publications/Reports/Report-139.pdf.
169. Unless a different sanction is imposed (e.g., a prison term is reduced to a fine).
170. [2000] NSWCCA 309 (Austl.).
171. Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10C (Austl.).
172. Morton v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 8, [41] (Austl.).
173. See R v Thomson (2000) 49 NSWLR 383, [155]; R v Cahyadi [2007]
NSWCCA 79; Phillips v The Queen (2012) 222 A Crim R 149; Morton v The Queen
[2014] NSWCCA 8; see also Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 13(2) (Austl.);
Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 5(2)(j) (Austl.); Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2)(e)
(Austl.); Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 8(2) (Austl.).
174. For discussion regarding the interchangeability of sanctions, see Andrew von
Hirsch et al., Punishments in the Community and the Principles of Desert, 20 RUTGERS
L. J. 595 (1989); Michael Tonry, Interchangeability, Desert Limits and Equivalence of
Function, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 291 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth
eds., 1998).
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accorded to this consideration. Further, sentencing law is an imprecise process.
In Australia, there are over 200 considerations that can aggravate or mitigate a
sentence 175 and there is no singularly correct penalty for an offense. Hence,
there is an inescapable degree of artificiality associated with injecting exactness into a process that is inherently approximate in nature.
Despite this, an analysis of how courts incorporate a guilty plea into their
sentencing determinations indicates a significant correlation between the theory and practice. A 2015 report by the Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council
examined 9,618 cases and noted that in 7,073 of these cases, it was possible to
discern the impact of a guilty plea on sentence 176 and that in about one-third
(33.5%) of these cases, the type of sanction that was imposed changed as a
result of the plea (e.g., from a prison term to a community corrections order). 177
In cases where a term of imprisonment was imposed, the average discount for
pleading guilty varied considerably. For sentences of imprisonment of two
years or less, the average reduction was thirty-nine percent, whereas for sentences of more than ten years, the average reduction was less than half this
amount – eighteen percent. 178 It is unclear why more serious matters would
attract lower penalty reductions, but, as a matter of speculation, it may be that
in relation to these matters, community protection was the cardinal sentencing
consideration. In any event, it is clear that as a matter of practice, offenders
who plead guilty in Australia generally receive a considerable sentencing discount.

B. Arguments For and Against the Guilty Plea Discount
There are a number of well-established reasons that underpin the guilty
plea discount. These are similar to those advanced to justify the plea bargaining process in the United States and are summarized by Justices Mary Gaudron,
William Gummow, and Ian Callinan in Cameron v The Queen, who stated:
Australian courts have indicated that they will regard a plea of guilty as
a mitigating factor even when no remorse or contrition is present. They
have taken the pragmatic view that giving sentence “discounts” to those
who plead guilty at the earliest available opportunity encourages pleas
of guilty, reduces the expense of the criminal justice system, reduces
court delays, avoids inconvenience to witnesses[,] and prevents the misuse of legal aid funds by the guilty. 179

175. BAGARIC & EDNEY, supra note 167, at 109.
176. VICTORIA SENT’G ADVISORY COUNCIL, GUILTY PLEAS IN THE HIGHER COURTS:

RATES, TIMING AND DISCOUNTS xv, xix (2015),
https://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication-documents/Guilty%20Pleas%20in%20the%20Higher%20Courts_2.pdf.
177. Id. at 59, 64.
178. Id. at 68.
179. [2002] HCA 6, [39].
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The most persuasive consideration in favor of the discount is financial
cost saving. Criminal trials typically take several weeks, and courts are expensive community institutions to fund. The guilty plea discount provides offenders a pragmatic incentive to plead guilty and thereby eliminate, or at least reduce, these costs. 180 The time and cost savings stemming from guilty pleas
provide powerful arguments in favor of maintaining the discount. If all persons
charged with a criminal offense pleaded not guilty, the criminal justice system
would literally grind to a halt – the delay between charge and trial would widen
to many years. 181 This point has also been noted by Justice Peter McClellan,
who, writing extra-judicially, stated:
Having an identifiable and easily understood parameter for guilty plea
discounts has had enormous benefit for the administration of criminal
justice. One only has to compare the state of the criminal lists in countries where a plea brings no discount to understand the benefits of a
structured sentencing approach . . . . Quantified discounts make the
reasoning of sentencing judges more comprehensible to offenders, victims, the public, and the appellate courts. 182

Apart from time and cost savings (and the consequential reduction in
court delays), the main reason advanced for according the discount is that it
avoids inconvenience to witnesses. 183 In Thomson, the Court noted:
A plea permits the healing process to commence. A victim does not
have to endure the uncertainty of not knowing whether he or she will
be believed, nor the skepticism sometimes displayed by friends and
even family prior to a conviction. A victim will also be spared the personal rumination of the events . . . . Like the element of remorse, this
consideration depends on the specific circumstances of the [offense]

180. In R v Thomson [2000] NSWCCA 309, the Court noted that the “public interest
served by encouraging pleas of guilty for their utilitarian value is a distinct interest,”
id. at [122], and that utilitarian benefits “require acknowledgment of some character by
way of an incentive, so that the benefits [of ‘the efficiency and effectiveness of the
criminal justice system as a whole’] will in fact be derived by the system,” id. at [115].
181. In most jurisdictions, about two-thirds of the matters are finalized by guilty
plea in the Higher Courts. K. Mack & S. Anleu, Reform of Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure: Guilty Pleas, 22 CRIM. L. J. 263, 264 (1998). The figure is higher in the Magistrates’ Court. Id.
182. PETER MCCLELLAN, SENTENCING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 17–18 (2012),
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/NSWJSchol/2012/20.pdf.
183. See, e.g., R v Osmond (1987) 1 Qd R 429; Schumacher (1981) 3 A Crim R
441; R v Fisher (1989) 40 A Crim R 442; R v Thomson [2000] NSWCCA 309 [3] (“[In]
sexual assault cases, crimes involving children and, often, elderly victims – there is a
particular value in avoiding the need to call witnesses, especially victims, to give evidence.”).
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and overlaps to a substantial extent with other aspects of the specific
case [that] are relevant to the sentencing task. 184

The guilty plea discount is not without its critics. The most forceful of
these is that the guilty plea discount penalizes offenders who elect to contest a
charge and exercise their right to a fair trial. 185 The High Court of Australia
has attempted to circumvent this claim by stating that the guilty plea discount
does not penalize those who elect to go to trial but simply punishes those who
plead guilty less. Yet, the plausibility of this distinction is debatable. In Cameron v The Queen, Justices Gaudron, Gummow, and Callinan were unable to
account for the distinction other than to state that “[t]he distinction between
allowing a reduction for a plea of guilty and not [penalizing] a convicted person for not pleading guilty is not without its subtleties, but it is, nonetheless, a
real distinction . . . .” 186
Further, the position that the guilty plea discount does not penalize defendants who proceed to trial contrasts sharply with that taken by Justice Michael McHugh in Cameron v The Queen, who correctly stated that the effect of
the discount is to more severely penalize those who plead not guilty. 187 Further, it has been noted that “it is a paradox [that] courts are diligent to prevent . . . pressure or inducement . . . to bring about an admission, . . . and yet
with . . . the plea of guilty such inducements have become institutionalized.” 188
This observation gets to the crux of the main argument against the discount,
which is that it may cross the threshold between providing an incentive to plead
guilty and coercing accused persons to forego their right to a hearing.
There is no firm evidence regarding whether the discount is so significant
that it influences defendants to forego their right to trial. In any event, from
the perspective of achieving substantive justice, this would only be a concern
if defendants that were innocent felt so troubled at the prospect of losing the
discount if the verdict went against them that they pleaded guilty. To this end,
it has been postulated that, in fact, some innocent defendants would invariably
plead guilty in order to attract the discount and avoid the uncertainties of the
outcome of a trial. 189 The fact that some people feel compelled to plead guilty

184. R v Thomson [2000] NSWCCA 309, [120] – [121].
185. See Cameron v The Queen [2002] HCA 6, [12]. It has also been suggested

that it discriminates against offenders who plead not guilty. Id. at [44]. The guilty plea
does not discriminate against non-guilty pleaders because there is an obvious relevant
difference between them and guilty pleaders: only the latter conducted their affairs in a
manner which saved the community considerable resources.
186. Id. [41] (emphasis added).
187. Id. at [39].
188. MARK FINDLAY, STEPHEN ODGERS & STANLEY YEO, AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 114–15 (1994); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining
Debate., 69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 688–90 (1981).
189. In the United Kingdom, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice has noted
that the risk of innocent people being pressured into pleading guilty “cannot be avoided
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is unsatisfactory. However, there is a means of overcoming this problem or at
least reducing the harm flowing from decisions of this nature. It is to this
means that we now turn.

C. Higher Discount When the Prosecution’s Case Is Weak
As noted above, we propose that defendants should receive a substantive
discount for pleading guilty. This should be in the order of one-third, with the
maximum discount being accorded when the plea is entered early. In addition
to this, there is also a need to deal with the issue of incentivized pleas for defendants against whom the prosecution’s case is weak. A greater discount
should be available in these circumstances.
This could be approached in two ways. First, the defendant could plead
guilty and, in the course of the plea, submit that the prosecution’s case is weak.
If the court accepts that submission, the defendant should be eligible for a
greater discount because, in effect, he or she gave up more than most other
defendants. He or she, in fact, passed up a tenable chance of acquittal and, in
doing so, realistically saved precious community resources by not proceeding
to trial. This is in fact a considerable sacrifice by defendants and one that
should be acknowledged by way of a considerable penalty discount. This approach will then have the further benefit of encouraging other defendants who
have weak cases against them to also plead guilty. In such circumstances, the
maximum discount should be seventy-five percent. The actual discount should
be determined by reference to two main considerations: (1) the weakness of the
prosecution’s case and (2) the timeliness of the plea. The highest discount
should be reserved for cases when the plea is entered at the first available opportunity and the prosecution’s case is demonstrably weak.
This proposal strikes a balance between the competing interests of the
state and those of defendants. It ensures that the utilitarian benefits of preserving the discount are retained while giving appropriate acknowledgment to the
fact that (1) waiving the right to trial is a considerable forfeiture, especially
when the defendant has a significant chance of acquittal, and (2) the discount
places pressure on defendants to plead guilty.
It could be contended that the same position could be reached if defendants were permitted to submit that they were in fact innocent but pleaded guilty
to attract the sentencing discount and to avoid the risk of an adverse trial outcome. The advantage of this option is that it reflects the reality that some innocent people do plead guilty. Further, there is support at the philosophical
level for the position that, in some circumstances, it is acceptable to punish the
innocent. This is so whether one adopts a utilitarian or retributive theory of
and although there can be no certainty as to the numbers . . . it would be naive to suppose” that it does not happen. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT 110
(1993),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/271971/2263.pdf.
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punishment. 190 This was an observation made by Professor George Schedler
from the Southern Illinois University nearly forty years ago:
Retributivists who advocate punishment are relevantly like utilitarians
who will sacrifice the welfare of innocents for the greater good, since
retributivists are willing to trade the welfare of the innocent who are
punished by mistake for the greater good of the punishment of the
guilty. While never intending to punish the innocent, they nevertheless
do not choose to withdraw their support for arrangements that have this
result. 191

In theory, defendants who are innocent should be permitted to maintain
their innocence and yet indicate that they plead guilty only in order to attract
the discount and not risk an adverse trial outcome. This would reflect the actual
position in which some defendants find themselves and the decision-making
calculus that they have pursued. 192 However, the feasibility of this approach
would be unworkable for a number of reasons. First, there is a strong tension
between punishing people while at the same time acknowledging their innocence. This tension is probably irreconcilable, given the strong community and
jurisprudential aversion to punishing people known to be innocent. Further, at
the pragmatic level, as is discussed below, most current sentencing schemes
require the sentencing judge to consider the factual basis of the defendant’s
guilty plea before agreeing to accept the plea. An assertion of innocence would
190. A common retributive response to the problem of punishing the innocent is
that offered by R. A. Duff, who denies that punishing the innocent is a concern for the
retributivist because, unlike the utilitarian situation, punishment of the innocent is not
intended and occurs despite the aims of a retributive system of punishment. See generally R. A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS (1985). The same point is made by Michael S. Moore, Justifying Retributivism, 27 ISR. L. REV. 15, 20 (1993). The credibility
of this response turns on the persuasiveness of the doctrine of double effect. It has been
argued that this doctrine is unsound. See Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, The
Errors of Retributivism, 24 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 125 (2000). But see R. A. Duff, In
Defence of One Type of Retributivism: A Reply to Bagaric and Amarasekera, 24
MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 411 (2000).
191. George Schedler, Can Retributivists Support Legal Punishment?, 63 MONIST
185, 189 (1980). For this reason, he concluded that retributivists simply cannot support
the institution of punishment. However, it must be noted that there are a large number
of different retributive theories. For an overview of many of the theories, see C. L.
TEN, CRIME, GUILT AND PUNISHMENT 38–65 (1987); TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT:
THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 211 (1984); MIRKO BAGARIC, PUNISHMENT AND
SENTENCING: A RATIONAL APPROACH (2001); John Cottingham, Varieties of Retributivism, 29 PHIL. Q. 238 (1979) (identifying nine different theories of punishment that
have been classified as retributive).
192. In fact, this was a position that two of the authors previously endorsed in the
context of the Australian sentencing system. See generally Mirko Bagaric & Julie
Brebner, The Solution to the Dilemma Presented by the Guilty Plea Discount: The
Qualified Guilty Plea – I’m Pleading Guilty Only Because of the Discount . . ., 30 INT’L
J. SOC. L. 51 (2002).
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almost certainly preclude the capacity and willingness of courts to proceed to
sentencing defendants.
Thus, in order for defendants to attract a discount up to seventy-five percent, they would need to plead guilty, acknowledge their guilt, and demonstrate
that the prosecution’s case was especially weak. In the more typical scenario,
where the prosecution’s case was at least satisfactory, the maximum discount
would be approximately fifty percent. We recognize that discounts of this nature are considerable. However, they are not so large as to undermine the efficacy and integrity of the criminal justice process. In Australia, defendants who
plead guilty and cooperate with authorities by giving evidence against their coaccused are eligible for a discount in excess of fifty percent, 193 and there is a
high degree of acceptance of this approach. There is no reason, in principle,
that a considerable discount for a guilty plea in the face of a weak prosecution
case should be approached differently.
This is true especially in light of the fact that the discount would be introduced in response to and in the context of wide-ranging acceptance that the
current plea bargaining process is manifestly and seriously flawed. As we have
seen, it utterly disempowers defendants and facilitates the imposition of prosecutorial coercion on them to plead – even in situations where there is a tenable
claim that they are innocent. The proposed reform deals with these shortcomings in a transparent, principled, and systematic manner that meaningfully restores the negotiating balance between the prosecution and defense by conferring more power to judges.

IV. RESPONSES TO LIKELY CRITICISM OF REFORM PROPOSAL
There are likely to be several criticisms of the above proposal. It is to
these that we now turn. Three main criticisms are likely to be made of the
proposed reform. The first is theoretical, the second is pragmatic, and the last
is legal. We deal with the theoretical critique first.

A. Punishing the Innocent
As noted above, a sentencing discount in the order of seventy-five percent
is large. The difference between, for example, a one-year prison term and a
four-year prison term is considerable. Four years removed from society, totally
disconnected from one’s relatives and friends and deprived of social and economic developments, can have a defining negative impact on an individual’s
well-being; twelve months is much more a temporary blip than a meaningful
exile. 194 Such disparities are likely to strongly encourage many defendants to
193. Mirko Bagaric, Abolishing the Curious Sentencing Anomaly Between the Voluntary Disclosure of One’s Own Offending and Assisting Authorities with the Offending of Others, 43 MONASH U. L. REV. 299, 314 (2017).
194. This is demonstrated by the notion of a “gap year,” which is commonplace and
does not result in social fracturing.
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plead guilty. This will apply to all defendants and especially to those who have
a fair chance of an acquittal because their potential discount is the largest. Paradoxically, the effect of our proposal is that defendants with the strongest defense will be most strongly encouraged to plead guilty. It is almost certain that
this will result in a portion of innocent defendants pleading guilty.
This is, on its face, a significant shortcoming of our proposal. At the jurisprudential level, it is repugnant to inflict punishment on people who are innocent. In abstract terms, of course, the criminal justice system should only
punish the guilty, but a claim that actual guilt is a precondition to punishment
is so unrealistic to be farcical. It is well-established that the system of trial and
proof is far from perfect, that many innocent people are convicted, 195 and that
some are even executed. 196 Further, it is clear that the current plea bargaining
process results in some innocent people pleading guilty.
In evaluating the desirability of legal reform, the reference point is not
abstract purity but the status quo. As we have seen, it is clear that the current
plea bargaining process results in many innocent people pleading guilty. This
is an unfortunate reality. While our proposal will have the same effect, it has
a demonstrable advantage over the current system. The transparency of the
reform means that defendants will know precisely the maximum discount that
is available to them if they relinquish their right to trial. This means that they
can make fully-informed, autonomous decisions regarding their criminal justice outcomes and have a basis for confidence that their prospect of acquittal,
if they had elected to exercise their right to trial, will be reflected in a significantly lower sentence. This is in contrast to the current situation where the
discount accorded to defendants in the plea bargaining process is, to some extent, driven by the opaqueness and fickleness of the respective negotiation
skills of counsel for the prosecution and defense.

B. Increased Court Time Required to Establish a Weak Prosecution
Case
A potential pragmatic difficulty with the reform proposal is that the
amount of court time involved in ascertaining the merits of the prosecution’s
case might be so extensive as to undermine the efficiency justification for the
guilty plea discount. However, for several reasons, this potential problem can
be surmounted. First, as noted above, before judges can accept a plea bargain
proposal, they must already inquire into the merits of the proposal to ensure
that that the arrangement is supported by evidence. 197 Thus, courts are already
accustomed to undertaking an, albeit perfunctory, examination of the merits of
the prosecution’s case against the defendant.
195. See supra Part II.
196. See supra Part II; see also see John L. Kane, Plea Bargaining and the Inno-

cent, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 26, 2014), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/26/plea-bargaining-and-the-innocent.
197. For example, character witnesses are often called on behalf of the defendant.
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Given that our proposal involves the courts having a greater degree of
sentencing discretion and power, it is understandable and expected that the
prosecution and defense counsel will desire to make more extensive submissions regarding the merits of their respective cases. This problem could be
circumvented by placing a ceiling on the length of time available to defense
counsel to outline the weaknesses of the prosecution’s case. In determining
this ceiling, it is necessary to keep in mind that an extensive hearing into the
exact strength of the defendant’s case would be wasteful and unnecessary. The
purpose of the inquiry is not to determine guilt or innocence – this has already
been resolved by the plea of guilty. The aim is simply to determine if the accused has a sufficiently strong defense. A useful reference point for setting
limits is the practice of the United States Supreme Court. In this context, parties are typically provided thirty minutes in oral argument. 198 The cases before
the United States Supreme Court generally involve complex and important legal issues. There is no basis for suggesting that sentencing matters should require any greater duration. In fact, given that guilt and innocence is not in
question, thirty minutes is too generous a time allocation. Courts should allocate no more than thirty minutes in total to hear submissions from the prosecution and defense regarding the strength of the prosecution’s case in circumstances where the parties do not agree on this issue. Thus, our proposal would
not result in a significant time burden on the courts. The current cost efficiencies of the present plea bargaining system would hence not be undercut.

C. Potential Constitutional Problems
A potentially more significant problem with the proposal is that it may
run afoul of constitutional limitations. There are potential difficulties that arise
in relation to statutory schemes that expressly (or by necessary implication)
incentivize defendants to enter pleas of guilty. At issue here are a criminal
defendant’s rights under the Fifth Amendment not to plead guilty 199 and under
the Sixth Amendment to demand a jury trial. 200 Under United States Supreme
Court precedent, statutes that implicitly give a defendant a discount in sentencing in exchange for a guilty or nolo contendere plea are unconstitutional if the
statute needlessly encourages such pleas or places an impermissible burden on
a defendant’s right to plead not guilty or to be tried by a jury. 201
In United States v. Jackson, the Court found unconstitutional a provision
of the Federal Kidnapping Act that required the trial court to impose the death
penalty if the jury recommended it but also provided for a lesser maximum
198. The Court and Its Procedures, U.S. SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/procedures.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2019).
199. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
200. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a . . . public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed . . . .” ).
201. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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penalty if the defendant was convicted following a bench trial or following a
guilty plea. 202 In putting to a defendant the choice of pleading guilty, opting
for a bench trial (thereby removing the possibility of the death penalty and restricting the maximum punishment to life imprisonment), or choosing instead
to proceed to a jury trial (where the jury could recommend a capital sentence),
the statute unconstitutionally burdened the defendant’s right not to plead guilty
and to be tried by a jury in exchange for the sentencing “discount.” 203 While
Jackson limited the ability of legislatures to enact criminal sentencing schemes
that incentivized a defendant to plead guilty in exchange for a “discount,” subsequent decisions of the Court have made clear that legislatures have some leeway in crafting such regimes.
In Corbitt v. New Jersey, the Court remarked that “there is no per se rule
against encouraging guilty pleas” and that “a [s]tate may encourage a guilty
plea by offering substantial benefits in return for [a guilty] plea.”204 Such substantial benefits may include even “the possibility or certainty [not only of] a
lesser penalty than the sentence that could be imposed after a trial and a verdict
of guilty . . . but also of a lesser penalty than that required to be imposed after
a guilty verdict by a jury.” 205 While limiting the scope of Jackson, the Corbitt
Court was careful to note that it “[did] not suggest that every conceivable statutory sentencing structure, plea bargaining system, or particular plea bargain
would be constitutional.” 206
While it is clear that legislatures may constitutionally offer criminal defendants the possibility of lesser or reduced sentences in exchange for nolo
contendere or guilty pleas, it is equally clear that legislatures are not given free
rein in doing so. Absent further guidance from the Court, it is unclear whether
the holdings in Jackson and Corbitt extend beyond circumstances in which the
defendant faces the possibility of a death sentence or whether these principles
are of more universal application. Some courts have taken the latter tack, holding that the rationales of Jackson and Corbitt apply regardless of the maximum
potential penalty. 207 For example, a Tennessee statute that allowed defendants
to plead guilty by mail instead of appearing for trial (reducing the maximum
penalty from a $500 fine and six months’ imprisonment to a fixed-sum fine of
less than $100) was found to impermissibly burden the exercise of the right to
a trial by jury since it “create[d] an unchecked danger of inaccurate [guilty or
nolo contendere] pleas.” 208
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 591.
Id. at 583.
439 U.S. 212, 218–19 (1978) (italics omitted).
Id. at 219 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Id. at 225 n.15.
See, e.g., Scharf v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Va. 1985); United
States v. Porter, 513 F. Supp. 245 (M.D. Tenn. 1981); State v. Frampton, 627 P.2d 922
(Wash. 1981).
208. Porter, 513 F. Supp. at 248. The court concluded that the huge difference
between the penalty faced by a defendant who pleaded guilty and the potential penalty
faced by a defendant who chose to invoke his constitutional right to trial by jury was
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Despite this, Congress and the states have enacted criminal sentencing
schemes that incentivize defendants, either expressly or implicitly, to plead
guilty to a charged offense. Apart from statutes that provide a “discount” by
their terms (e.g., sentence of death upon recommendation of a jury), the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines themselves encourage defendants to enter guilty pleas.
Under the heading of “acceptance of responsibility,” if a defendant “clearly
demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense,” the defendant’s offense level (i.e., the level from which the range of possible sentences is drawn)
is to be decreased by two levels. 209 For some defendants, the resulting reduction in the range of incarceration is substantial incentive for entering a guilty
plea. 210
While it is evident that states can, at least to some extent, constitutionally
incentivize defendants to plead guilty, most states do not express significant
sentence discounts or reductions within their substantive and procedural criminal laws for defendants who plead guilty. A survey of the five largest states
(California, Texas, New York, Florida, and Illinois) shows that most typically
classify the results of the plea bargaining as a mitigating factor that judges and
juries should (or must) take into account when recommending or imposing sentences that constitute a downward departure from the lowest penalty permitted
under statute. Thus, while a defendant may be enticed to plead guilty in the
hope that his or her plea will serve as a mitigating factor justifying a downward
departure from a more severe penalty – one he or she would have faced had he
or she proceeded to trial and been convicted by a jury – his or her plea is not
the quid pro quo for a guaranteed sentence reduction.
Under California’s determinate sentencing scheme, trial courts may consider a defendant’s guilty plea as a factor in mitigation of the imposition of a
more severe sentence. “When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed
and the statute specifies three possible terms, the choice of the appropriate term

likely to result in a deluge of inaccurate pleas as defendants who were, in fact, innocent
would take the “discount” option instead of exercising their rights. Id. at 249.
209. Federal Sentencing Guidelines § 3E1.1(a). If a defendant qualifies for a decrease, the offense level prior to the decrease is level sixteen or greater, and
upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the
government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government and the
court to allocate their resources efficiently, the offense level is further reduced
by one level.

Id. § 3E1.1(b).
210. See An Offer You Can’t Refuse, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Dec. 5, 2013),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/05/offer-you-cant-refuse/how-us-federal-prosecutors-force-drug-defendants-plead (illustrating that a defendant with an offense level
of thirty and a criminal history category of III can reduce his potential sentencing range
from 121-151 months to 84-108 months with a timely guilty plea).
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shall rest within the sound discretion of the court.” 211 To aid trial courts in
selecting between one of the three possible terms, “either party or the victim,
or the family of the victim if the victim is deceased, may submit a statement in
aggravation or mitigation.” 212 Circumstances in mitigation include factors relating specifically to the defendant as well as factors relating to the crime. 213
“Factors relating to the defendant include that . . . [t]he defendant voluntarily
acknowledged wrongdoing before arrest or at an early stage of the criminal
process.” 214 Thus, a guilty plea entered at an early stage of the criminal process
can serve as a voluntary acknowledgement of wrongdoing that a trial court can
consider in mitigation. 215 However, while an early guilty plea can, in general,
be considered as a mitigating factor, some courts refuse to consider a guilty
plea induced by the plea bargaining process as a mitigating factor because,
through the plea bargain, the defendant received the full benefit of the admission. 216 Furthermore, a guilty plea entered at or near trial may not be considered as a mitigating factor because by entering the guilty plea near the end of
the criminal proceedings, the plea does not constitute an acknowledgement of
wrongdoing at an early stage of the criminal process. 217
In Texas, some defendants’ decision to plead guilty or no contest affects
whether they qualify for a favorable program known as deferred adjudication
community supervision.
[I]f in the judge’s opinion the best interest of society and the de-

fendant will be served, the judge may, after receiving a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere, hearing the evidence, and finding that
it substantiates the defendant’s guilt, defer further proceedings
without entering an adjudication of guilt and place the defendant
on deferred adjudication community supervision. 218

Under deferred adjudication community supervision, “the defendant is
placed on community supervision without a finding of guilt and without being
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West 2019).
Id.
Cal. R. 4.423.
Cal. R. 4.423(b)(3).
See, e.g., People v. Holguin, 262 Cal. Rptr. 331, 336 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989);
People v. Nelson, No. A105925, 2005 WL 407797, at * 3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
216. See, e.g., People v. Burg, 120 Cal. App. 3d 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (“The
Judicial Council did not have a plea bargain in mind when it proposed as a circumstance
in mitigation a defendant’s early admission of guilt.”); People v. Close, No. D041522,
2004 WL 723131, at * 3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“However, some courts consider a guilty
plea entered in a plea bargain not to be a factor in mitigation.”).
217. See, e.g., People v. Sears, No. E034679, 2004 WL 1283170, at * 4 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004).
218. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 42A.101(a) (West 2019) (emphasis added).
Importantly, only certain defendants are eligible for deferred adjudication community
supervision. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 42A.101(b) (West 2019).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss1/5

42

Bagaric et al.: Plea Bargaining

2019]

PLEA BARGAINING

43

convicted of any offense.” 219 If the defendant completes the term of deferred
adjudication community supervision without requiring the judge to proceed to
an adjudication of guilt, “the proceedings are dismissed, the defendant is discharged, and the defendant is deemed not to have a conviction for many purposes.” 220 Thus, for eligible defendants, the potential benefits of deferred adjudication community supervision serve as a substantial incentive to forgo trial
and plead guilty or no contest. Texas’ decision to offer deferred adjudication
community supervision only to those defendants who plead guilty or no contest
has been challenged on constitutional grounds. 221 In Reed v. State, 222 the defendant argued that the deferred adjudication community supervision scheme
“has no other purpose or effect than to penalize assertion of the right not to
plead guilty.” In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the court noted that “[t]he
purpose of the statute is to allow the trial court the flexibility to defer adjudication for deserving defendants” and that limiting the availability of deferred
adjudication community supervision to defendants who plead guilty or no contest “reflects both a desire to conserve scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources and the practical knowledge that [deferred adjudication community supervision] will very often be utilized as part of a plea-bargain arrangement.” 223
Ultimately, the court concluded that deferred adjudication community supervision is constitutional under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution even though the program may occasionally have the effect
of encouraging defendants to relinquish the right to trial and plead guilty. 224
In Florida, for example, a downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure. 225 Departure from the lowest permissible
sentence is reasonably justified when “[t]he departure results from a legitimate,
uncoerced plea bargain.” 226 Notably, the mitigating effect of a guilty plea applies to any felony offense other than capital felonies; 227 a defendant’s entry of
a guilty or nolo contendere plea does not serve as a mitigating factor weighing
219. 43A TEX. PRAC. § 47:30 (3d Ed. 2017). “‘Community supervision’ means the
placement of a defendant by a court under a continuum of programs and sanctions, with
conditions imposed by the court for a specified period during which . . . criminal proceedings are deferred without an adjudication of guilt.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
§ 42A.001(1)(A) (West 2019).
220. Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
221. See, e.g., Moses v. State, No. 05-06-00338-CR, 2007 WL 1098436, at *2–3
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
222. 644 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), superseded by TEX. R. EVID.
702.
223. Id. at 483.
224. Id. at 483–84; see Moses, 2007 WL 1098436, at *3 (“The deferred adjudication statute does not put an unconstitutional burden on a defendant’s right to a jury
trial.”).
225. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0026(1) (West 2019).
226. Id. § 921.0026(2)(a).
227. Id. § 921.0026.
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against the imposition of the death penalty, and a defendant can be sentenced
to death notwithstanding his plea of guilty. 228
In Illinois, there are no incentives structured into statutes to encourage
defendants to plead guilty. 229 Illinois, like all of the five largest U.S. jurisdictions, encourages plea bargaining. 230 However, the benefits that a defendant
may gain from plea bargaining do not appear to extend beyond the consideration of a guilty plea as a mitigating factor in sentencing for certain crimes. 231
Moreover, the mitigating effect of plea bargaining is not statutory in nature; it
exists by way of judicial fiat. 232 In any event, however, the parties to a plea
agreement cannot bargain for a sentence that the court is not authorized by
statute to impose. 233 Thus, while entering a guilty plea may operate to reduce
a sentence, it cannot operate to justify a downward departure from the minimum permissible statutory sentence.
New York once had a death penalty sentencing scheme under which a
defendant could only be sentenced to death by recommendation of a convicting
jury. 234 The scheme was invalidated under the authority of Jackson. 235 Apart
from this now defunct statute, New York law does not afford any express statutory incentive for pleading guilty. 236
Thus, in the United States it is not conventional for a designated discount
to be accorded for a guilty plea. The key reason for this, in our view, is because
most matters are disposed by way of a plea bargain and this negotiation generally incorporates a sentencing reduction, the fulcrum around which is the guilty
plea. Given that well over ninety percent of matters are finalized pursuant to a
plea bargain, there is no imperative for a guilty plea discount to be formalized
in a statutory form.
We acknowledge that there is prospect of our proposal being subjected to
constitutional challenge. However, the reasoning in Jackson and Corbitt is
unlikely to undermine the legality of a formal guilty plea sentencing discount.
The proposal in this Article places a far lesser burden on a defendant’s right to
plead not guilty than the current plea bargaining process, whereby nearly all of
the negotiating power rests with the prosecution and there are no defined sen-

228.
229.
230.
231.

See id. § 921.141.
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-2 (2018).
See People v. Hart, 828 N.E.2d 260, 266 (Ill. 2005); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 402(f).
People v. Hernandez, 562 N.E.2d 219, 226 (Ill. 1990) (noting that a guilty plea,
while not a statutorily enumerated mitigating factor, may be considered by the court in
levying a more lenient sentence).
232. Id.
233. People v. Hare, 734 N.E.2d 515, 518 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000).
234. See Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 1205 (N.Y. 1998).
235. Id. at 1209.
236. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.30 (McKinney 2018), invalidated by Parker
v. Phillips, 717 F. Supp. 2d 310 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
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tencing reduction parameters that defendants can utilize to assist with their negotiations. 237 Moreover, in Corbitt, the Court expressly acknowledged that it
is permissible to encourage a guilty plea by offering a substantial discount. 238
Our proposal does just that and does so in a manner whereby defendants are
less incentivized to plead guilty because greater transparency and judicial oversight will be injected in the sentencing process. 239

CONCLUSION
The fates of millions of Americans who are charged with criminal offenses each year are not determined in court. They are determined following a
negotiation with a prosecutor. In this negotiation, prosecutors have considerably more bargaining power than defendants. Prosecutors are normally better
resourced and do not have important personal interests at stake. Defendants
often face the risk of considerable prison time if a trial outcome is adverse to
their interests. No such risk confronts prosecutors. Thus, there is considerable
pressure on defendants not to proceed to trial. The pressure is so significant
that it has been noted that it is rational for defendants to plead guilty. This
places the prosecution at an enormous advantage in the plea bargaining process. This strategic advantage manifests in prosecutors often insisting on severe penalties. The one-sided plea bargaining process is a principal reason for
the mass incarceration crisis that exists in America today.

237. People v. Collins, a Supreme Court of California case, illustrates how certain
offers of benefits in exchange for a defendant’s waiver of trial rights can run afoul of
the Constitution and how the proposed sentencing reform avoids these pitfalls. 27 P.3d
726 (Cal. 2001). In Collins, the trial court advised the defendant that he would receive
“some benefit” in exchange for waiving his right to a jury trial. Id. at 728. However,
the court did not specify the nature of the benefit. Id. On review, the Supreme Court
of California concluded that because the defendant did not understand the full extent of
what he was getting in exchange for his waiver, the defendant did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights and, as such, he was deprived of due process. Id. at 731–34. Additionally, the court took issue with the fact that the trial court
itself actively participated in obtaining the defendant’s waiver, thus rendering it incapable of impartially determining whether the defendant validly waived his rights and
injecting a “substantial danger of unintentional coercion” into the process. Id. at 734
(quoting People v. Orin, 533 P.2d 193, 197 (Cal. 1975)). Our proposal avoids both of
these potential problems. First, because the sentencing discount would be clearly defined at the outset of the process, the defendant would know exactly what he is gaining
in exchange for forfeiting his right to not plead guilty and his right to a jury trial. Second, the judge, while assuming a greater role in the guilty plea negotiation process,
would not be a “party” to the process in the manner condemned in Collins. The judge
would not be making the discount offer. Instead, the judge would simply apply the law
to the facts to determine what discount the defendant would be entitled to – a function
very much in accordance with a judge’s ordinary duties.
238. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218–20 (1978).
239. See supra Part III.
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Despite the manifest shortcomings of the plea bargaining process, it is
untenable to abolish a system that results in most defendants pleading guilty.
More than ninety-five percent of all criminal matters are resolved in this manner, and the justice system simply does not have the capacity to undertake a
significantly large number of trials. A solution to the problems with the plea
bargaining process must be found within the structural confines of the current
system. This Article offers one such solution. The solution is based on three
key pillars. First, the system should be more transparent. Second, prosecution
officials should have less influence in the outcome of the bargain. Finally, the
reform should not involve an extensive increase in the court time required to
finalize a matter.
These three objectives can be met by reforming the sentencing system
such that a sentencing discount of up to thirty percent applies for defendants
who plead guilty. The discount should be the highest in circumstances when a
plea is entered early in the proceedings. In addition to this, a discount of up to
seventy-five percent should be available when defendants plead guilty in light
of a weak prosecution case.
The existence of these discounts would introduce a high level of transparency into the sentencing system and shift considerable power from prosecutors
to judges, thereby leading to fairer and more impartial decisions. Absent a
reform of this nature, the sentencing system will continue to be distorted by the
fundamental mismatch in the negotiating positions of defendants and prosecutors, thereby continuing to seriously undermine the integrity of criminal justice
in America.
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